| Annotation Metadata
|
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hyurx9nevz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ18Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ18Ӻ","endOffset":1204°Ӻ,"quote":"One of the standard objections to constructivism, particularly radical constructivism, runs somewhat like this: ‘there’s a book in front of you on the table; you know it’s a book, I know it’s a book, and anyone who looks at it would recognize it as a book – why do you keep telling us that the book is not really there?’ To give anything like a complete answer to this question, one would have to explicate at least all the key ideas of the constructivist approach I have listed above, and one would have to reiterate that constructivism deals with knowing not with being. There is no simple argument to justify the distinction between experiential reality and ontological reality. One might reply that life would be a lot easier if no one claimed to know the world as it is, and that the constructivist orientation is one way to avoid such claims. As a constructivist, I have never said (nor would I ever say) that there is no ontic world, but I keep saying that we cannot know it. I am in agreement with Maturana when he says: ‘an observer has no operational basis to make any statements or claim about objects, entities or relations as if they existed independently of what he or she does’ (1988: 30).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321053202177302183022":^°°,^"jQuery321053202177302183022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1561981770929°
|
