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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"L0fc4ds4mj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":470°Ӻ,"quote":"If, however, as Alcmaeon already suggested, the human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture of the world but only to conjectural interpretation, then that activity can be viewed as the creating of keys with whose help man unlocks paths towards the goals he chooses. That means that the second question we asked at the end of the preceding section, namely, why a cognitive activity should take place, is inextricably connected with the first one:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551965327427°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lq8qrfv45i","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":178,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"This activity is, of course, not a manipulating of “things in themselves,” i.e., of objects that could be thought to possess, prior to being experienced, the properties and the structure which the experiencer attributes to them. We therefore call the activity that builds up knowledge “operating,” and it is the operating of that cognitive entity which, as Piaget has so succinctly formulated, organizes its experiential world by organizing itself. Epistemology thus becomes the study of how the mind operates, of the ways and means it employs to construct a relatively regular world out of the flow of its experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174590008°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ls36qph8h8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ31Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ31Ӻ","endOffset":281°Ӻ,"quote":"Causes thus originate in the putting together of individual elements; that is, they originate from an experiencer’s active operating, such that, for instance, “the determinate (i.e., causally determined) form of the object springs from the order and the composition of elements.”26","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551174537006°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Luw055wkng","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1054°Ӻ,"quote":"Within the limits of one chapter, an unconventional way of thinking can certainly not be thoroughly justified, but it can, perhaps, be presented in its most characteristic features anchored here and there in single points. There is, of course, the danger of being misunderstood. In the case of constructivism, there is the additional risk that it will be discarded at first sight because, like skepticism – with which it has a certain amount in common – it might seem too cool and critical, or simply incompatible with ordinary common sense. The proponents of an idea, as a rule, explain its non-acceptance differently than do the critics and opponents. Being myself much involved, it seems to me that the resistance met in the 18th century by Giambattista Vico, the first true constructivist, and by Silvio Ceccato and Jean Piaget in the more recent past, is not so much due to inconsistencies or gaps in their argumentation, as to the justifiable suspicion that constructivism intends to undermine too large a part of the traditional view of the world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Schwächen und die Möglichkeit der Missinterpretation der eigenen Theorie aufzeigen","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551171138644°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M30crhx4in","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","endOffset":178°Ӻ,"quote":"First, there is the realization that knowledge, i.e., what is “known,” cannot be the result of a passive receiving but originates as the product of an active subject’s activity.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174580104°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mukx7wqy5i","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":235,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"Vico does not answer that question; rather, he makes it superfluous and meaningless. If, as he says, the world that we experience and get to know is necessarily constructed by ourselves, it should not surprise us that it seems relatively stable. To appreciate this, it is necessary to keep in mind that the most fundamental trait of constructivist epistemology, i.e., that the world that is constructed is an experiential world that consists of experiences and makes no claim whatsoever about “truth” in the sense of correspondence with an ontological reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ322836,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ316580,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Welt, die konstruiert ist, ist eine erfahrene Welt, die keinerlei Anspruch auf \"Wahrheit\" im Sinne der Übereinstimmung mit einer ontologischen Welt","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551174454424°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"N8vvmji8uv","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":155°Ӻ,"quote":"In the history of knowledge, as in the theory of evolution, people have spoken of “adaptation” and, in doing so, a colossal misunderstanding was generated.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210162914505684703452":^°,"sizzle1560439090281":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ21658,31,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Innovationsdiskurs2","data_creacio":1551172618735°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nlpplg3gzh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":630°Ӻ,"quote":"In the history of knowledge, as in the theory of evolution, people have spoken of “adaptation” and, in doing so, a colossal misunderstanding was generated. If we take seriously the evolutionary way of thinking, it could never be organisms or ideas that adapt to reality, but it is always reality which, by limiting what is possible, inexorably annihilates what is not fit to live. In phylogenesis, as in the history of ideas, “natural selection” does not in any positive sense select the fittest, the sturdiest, the best, or the truest, but it functions negatively, in that it simply lets go under whatever does not pass the test.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°,"sizzle1552300422037":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ57681,31,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"\"Durch \"Natürliche Selektion\" werden nicht die Stärksten und Fittesten selektiert, sondern die aussortiert, die den Test der Überlebensfähigkeit nicht überstehen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551960671111°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nt0esta93s","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","startOffset":731,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","endOffset":893°Ӻ,"quote":"By taking for granted that knowledge must reflect reality traditional epistemology has created for itself a dilemma that was as inevitable as it was unsolvable.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Dilemma der klassischen Sichtweise ","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551173513426°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Numzp44srj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","endOffset":1372°Ӻ,"quote":"No one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece. \nA similar, often cited example, is the movie film which, depending on the conditions of perception, we see as a sequence of individually different images or as one continuously moving image. Irrespective of any “real” horse that may or may not have trotted somewhere at some time and been filmed while doing so, when the film is presented to us, we ourselves must construct the motion by constituting a continuous change of one horse from the succession of images. The fact that we do that unconsciously can not alter the fact that we have to do it in order to perceive the motion.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551175704169°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"O62gbw673y","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ19Ӻ","startOffset":825,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ19Ӻ","endOffset":1407°Ӻ,"quote":". Donald Campbell, who has provided an excellent survey of proponents of “evolutionary epistemology” since Darwin, writes: “The controversial issue is the conceptual inclusion of the real world, defining the problem of knowledge as the fit of data and theory to that real world.”12 In his conclusion he then declares that the evolutionary epistemology, which he and Karl Popper represent, “is fully compatible with an advocacy of the goals of realism and objectivity in science.” But the theory of which he provided an extremely lucid exposition, points in the opposite direction.13","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173464998°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ohygf3hivn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":234°Ӻ,"quote":"Our main question was how it might come about that we experience a relatively stable and reliable world in spite of the fact that we are unable to ascribe stability, regularity, or any other perceived property to an objective reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551174209939°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oo2fdu92ea","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":644°Ӻ,"quote":"If, however, as Alcmaeon already suggested, the human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture of the world but only to conjectural interpretation, then that activity can be viewed as the creating of keys with whose help man unlocks paths towards the goals he chooses. That means that the second question we asked at the end of the preceding section, namely, why a cognitive activity should take place, is inextricably connected with the first one: because the success of a key does not depend on finding a lock into which it might fit, but solely on whether or not it opens the way to the particular goal we want to reach.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Der Erfolg eines Schlüssels hängt nicht davon ab, ob ein Schloss gefunden wird, in das er passt, sonndern nur davon, ob er den Weg zu einem bestimmten Ziel öffnet. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551966076341°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ow2des8aoy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":608,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"the world that is constructed is an experiential world that consists of experiences and makes no claim whatsoever about “truth” in the sense of correspondence with an ontological reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174242322°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P2rwrijst5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":1408°Ӻ,"quote":"These considerations fit the basic problem of the theory of knowledge equally well. Quite generally, our knowledge is useful, relevant, viable, or however we want to call the positive end of the scale of evaluation, if it stands up to experience and enables us to make predictions and to bring about or avoid, as the case may be, certain phenomena (i.e., appearances, events, experiences). If knowledge does not serve that purpose, it becomes questionable, unreliable, useless, and is eventually devaluated as superstition. That is to say, from the pragmatic point of view, we consider ideas, theories, and “laws of nature” as structures which are constantly exposed to our experiential world (from which we derived them), and they either hold up or they do not. Any cognitive structure that serves its purpose in our time, therefore, proves no more and no less than just that – namely, given the circumstances we have experienced (and determined by experiencing them), it has done what was expected of it. Logically, that gives us no clue as to how the “objective” world might be; it merely means that we know one viable way to a goal that we have chosen under specific circumstances in our experiential world. It tells us nothing – and cannot tell us anything – about how many other ways there might be, or how that experience which we consider the goal might be connected to a world beyond our experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551962178265°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P9zxwcufnk","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":188°Ӻ,"quote":"If knowledge is to be a description or image of the world as such, we need a criterion that might enable us to judge when our descriptions or images are “right” or “true.” Thus, with the scenario in which man is born into a ready-made independent world as a “discoverer” with the task of exploring and “knowing” that reality in the truest possible fashion, with this scenario the path of skepticism is there from the outset. The notion of “appearance” and “semblance” which, according to Xenophanes attaches to all human knowledge, was elaborated and applied above all to perception by Pyrrho’s school and, later, by Sextus Empiricus; and the unanswerable question whether, or to what extent, any picture our senses “convey” might correspond to the “objective” reality is still today the crux of all theory of knowledge. Sextus used, among other things, an apple as an example. To our senses it appears smooth, scented, sweet, and yellow – but it is far from self-evident that the real apple possesses these properties, just as it is not at all obvious that it does not possess other properties as well, properties that are simply not perceived by our senses.16 \nThe question is unanswerable, because no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ298099,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ297797,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Wir können unsere Wahrnehmung nur durch den Vergleich mit anderen Wahrnehmungen prüfen, aber nie mit dem Objekt wie es sein könnte, bevor wir es wahrnehmen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551173653295°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pughfc3e56","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":474°Ӻ,"quote":"More important still is the epistemological aspect of the analogy. In spite of the often misleading assertions of ethologists, the structure of behavior of living organisms can never serve as a basis for conclusions concerning an “objective” world, i.e., a world as it might be prior to experience.8 The reason for this, according to the theory of evolution, is that there is no causal link between that world and the survival capacity of biological structures or behaviors.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Es gibt keinen Zusammenhang zwischen den \"objektiven\" Welt und der Überlebensfähigkeit biologischer Strukturen und Verhaltensweisen. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551961059877°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q7cxrlzqk8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","endOffset":486°Ӻ,"quote":"Constructivism necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed) assumption that all cognitive activity takes place within the experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness. Goal-directedness, in this context has, of course, nothing to do with goals in an “external” reality. The goals that are involved here arise for no other reason than this: a cognitive organism evaluates its experiences, and because it evaluates them, it tends to repeat certain ones and to avoid others.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174758386°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q9czaceqbg","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":700°Ӻ,"quote":"In everyday English, that conceptual opposition can be brought out quite clearly by pitting the words “match” and “fit” against one another in certain contexts. The metaphysical realist looks for knowledge that matches reality in the same sense as you might look for paint to match the color that is already on the wall that you have to repair. In the epistemologist’s case it is, of course, not color that concerns him, but he is, nevertheless, concerned with some kind of “homomorphism,” which is to say, an equivalence of relations, sequence, or characteristic structure – something, in other words, that he can consider the same, because only then could he say that his knowledge is of the world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551959610705°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qgaf10vi1r","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","startOffset":38,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":188°Ӻ,"quote":"no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551173635785°
