Annotation:Text:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Fgoa49b6kt

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Annotation of Text:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2019-12-11T13:56:09.932Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Fgoa49b6kt","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":1523,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":2734°Ӻ,"quote":"Two further points have to be made. The first is that Aristotle saw the premises of a syllogism as the material cause of the conclusion. This was his way of saying what logicians have reiterated ever since, namely that the deductive procedure does not generate new knowledge, but merely picks out or recombines elements that are already contained in the premises. (This, of course, in no way precludes the fact that the deductive procedure often brings out features of whose presence in the premises one was unaware.) \nThe second is that Aristotle, as we saw above, held that definitions are to be considered the formal cause of the entity that is defined. The example of the bronze statue again offers a useful image. The shape of the statue is quite literally ‘defined’ by the mold, in the sense that the mold constrains and delimits where the liquid metal can flow. Analogously, the ‘parts of a definition’ constrain and delimit both conceptual construction and the application of concepts. Definitions set conditions which the abstract form we call concept must satisfy, and it is the same conditions that some experiential material must fit in order to be accepted as a proper instantiation of the concept.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099864354518580382":^°°,^"jQuery321099864354518580382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1576068969415°
Thema Wissen
Thema Erfahrung