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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Teh0fxmykb","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":2731°Ӻ,"quote":"The distinction between form and content has a history as long as Western philosophy and the terms have been used in many different ways. Piaget’s use of the distinction is complicated by the fact that he links it with his use of “observables” (content) and “coordinations” (forms). “The functions of form and content are relative, since every form becomes content for another that comprises it” (Piaget et al., 1977, Vol.II; p.319). This will make sense, only if one recalls that, for Piaget, percepts, observables, and any knowledge of objects, are all the result of a subject’s action and not externally caused effects registered by a passive receiver. In his theory, to perceive, to remember, to re- present, and to coordinate are all dynamic, in the sense that they are activities carried out by a subject that operates on internally available material and produces certain results. A term such as “exogenous”, therefore, must not be interpreted as referring to a physical outside relative to a physical organism, but rather as referring to something that is external relative to the process in which it becomes involved. Observation and re-presentation have two things in common: (1) they operate on items which, relative to the process at hand, are considered given. The present process takes them as elements and coordinates them as “content” into a new “form” or “structure”; and (2) the resulting new products can be taken as initial “givens” by a future process of structuring, relative to which they then become “content”. Thus, once a process is achieved, its results may be considered “observables” or “exogenous” relative to a subsequent process of coordination or a higher level of analysis. As Piaget saw, this might seem to lead to an infinite regress (Piaget et al., 1977, Vol.II; p.306), but he put forth at least two arguments to counter this notion. One of them emerges from his conception of scientific analysis. Very early in his career, he saw this analysis as a cyclical program in which certain elements abstracted by one branch of science become the “givens” for coordination and abstraction in another. In an early paper (Piaget, 1929) and almost forty years later in his “classification of the sciences” (Piaget, 1967), he formulated this mutual interdependence of the scientific disciplines as a circle: Biology—Psychology—Mathematics—Physics, and looping back to Biology. Hence, from his perspective, there is no linear progression without end, but simply development of method and concepts in one discipline leading to novel conceptualization and coordination in another. The recent impact of the physics of molecules and particles on the conceptual framework of biology would seem a good example.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560431348903°
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