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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hdj6x0bfi1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":703°Ӻ,"quote":"It is obvious that the construction of a viability of which I can say with some justification that it seems to reach beyond my own field of experience into that of Others, must play an important part in the stabilization and solidification of my experiential reality. In fact, it helps to create that highest level of which we then believe that it is shared by Others and, therefore “more real” than anything experienced only by ourselves.\nThis kind of corroboration, one might think, is much more easily and much more generally achieved by linguistic communication. From the constructivist point of view, however, the notion of “sharing” as a result of a linguistic exchange turns out to be the result of the very same kind of imputation we have discussed above. This brief summary is not the place to expand on the constructivist approach to language and communication.Ӷ4Ӻ All I want to say here is that, in spite of the fact that it often feels as though the meaning of words and sentences were conveyed to us by the sounds of speech or the signs on a printed page, it is easy to show that meanings do not travel through space and must under all circumstances be constructed in the heads of the language users. If we then ask, what these meanings could be made of, we find that the only raw material available is the stock of experiential records the individual language user has so far accumulated. There is no doubt that these subjective meanings get modified, honed, and adapted throughout the course of social interaction. But this adaptation does not and cannot change the fact that the material of which these meanings consist can be taken only from the individual language user’s subjective experience. (Note that, in this respect, social adaptation is analogous to biological adaptation: it can do no more than bring out, recombine, or thwart what is already in the organism – it cannot instill new elements.)\nIt may be useful to repeat that constructivism does not deny reality, nor does it deny that the living organism interacts with an environment; but it does deny that the human knower can come to know reality in the ontological sense. The reason for this denial is simply that the human knower’s interactions with the ontic world may reveal to some extent what the human knower can do – the space in which the human knower can move –, but they cannot reveal the nature of the constraints within which the human knower’s movements are confined. Constructivism, thus, does not deny the “existence” of Others, it merely holds that insofar as we know these Others, they are models that we ourselves construct.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321064372077744730692":^°°,^"jQuery321064372077744730692":^°°,^"jQuery321064372077744730692":^°°,^"jQuery321064372077744730692":^°°,^"jQuery321064372077744730692":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1561975933790°
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