Annotation:Text:The Control of Perception and the Construction of Reality: Epistemological Aspects of the Feedback-Control System/T7pkbl3avd

Referenztyp:	Theorie

Annotation of	Text:The_Control_of_Perception_and_the_Construction_of_Reality:_Epistemological_Aspects_of_the_Feedback-Control_System
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date	2020-01-29T17:05:07.629Z
Last Modification User	User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata	^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"T7pkbl3avd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":191,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ3Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":324°Ӻ,"quote":"Science is not a search for a set of facts which are incorrigible. For Naess, “Anything is possible,” (1972, p. 88) and for Feyerabend, “Any idea can become plausible” (1970, p. 301). The point of their work has been to examine the structure of human knowledge, after acknowledging its limitations.\nThere are clear precedents for this approach in, what Richard Popkin refers to as “constructive or mitigated scepticism” (1964, Ch. VII). Pierre Gassendi tries to hold the middle of the road.\n\nFor the dogmatists do not really know everything they think they know, nor do they have the appropriate criterions to determine it; but neither does everything that the sceptics turn into the subject of debate seem to be so completely unknown that no criterion can be found for determining it. (Pierre Gassendi 1658, p. 326)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210135720801970090732":^°°,^"jQuery3210135720801970090732":^°°,^"jQuery3210135720801970090732":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1580313907239°