Editing Walk:SpracheWeltenkurz

|subTitle=Ernst von Glasersfelds Verhältnis zu Sprache

|explanationText=Glasersfeld hatte ein spannendes Verhältnis zu Sprachen. Er war noch ein kleines Kind, als seine Familie aus München nach Meran zog. Zuhause sprachen die Glasersfelds Deutsch, in der Schule sprach Ernst Italienisch. Wenn seine Eltern nicht wollten, dass er sie verstand, sprachen sie Englisch - das motivierte den Buben, auch schon früh Englisch zu lernen. Im Internat kamen schließlich Französisch und Latein dazu. Der junge Glasersfeld erkannte dabei bald, dass verschiedene Sprachen auch unterschiedliche Zugänge zur Welt vermittelten.

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|stationHeader=Glasersfeld empfand die Unterschiede zwischen Sprachen als eine spannende Erfahrung.

|stationText=You cannot help realizing that the world a native speaker of, say, German experiences and talks about is noticeably different from the world of a native speaker of Italian; both their worlds are different again from those of a Frenchmen or a Briton – let alone a native speaker of American English. Even the everyday things a young man like myself might have been interested in – things supposed to be common to all languages, like cars, mountains, girls, and food – are not quite the same in the experiential worlds of speakers of different languages. Having noticed this, you also begin to suspect that the concepts associated with words are not the same from person to person in one and the same language.

|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician

|stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Why_I_Consider_Myself_a_Cybernetician

|stationImageURL=https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2018/05/10/16/52/machine-3388001_960_720.jpg

|stationType=normal

|stationText=SHANNON’s mathematical theory (1948) confirmed that only directives of choice and combination could travel between communicators, but not the meanings that have to be selected and combined to interpret a message. Language users, therefore, build up their meanings on the basis of their individual experience, and the meanings remain subjective, no matter how much they become modified and homogenized through the subject’s interactions with other language users. From the constructivist point of view, meanings are conceptual structures and, as such, to a large extent influence the individual’s construction and organization of his or her experiential reality.

|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Constructivism in Education

|stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Constructivism_in_Education

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|stationText=Given that Maturana, at various places in his writings, makes it very clear that he considers unacceptable the concept that is usually linked with the word “representation”, it may surprise one at first that, in the passage quoted here, he bases a discrimination of conversations on “expectations”. In my analysis, to have an expectation means to represent to oneself something that one has not yet isolated by means of distinctions in the present flow of actual experience. The apparent contradiction disappears, however, if one considers that the English word “representation” is used to designate several different concepts, two among which are designated in German by the two words Darstellung and Vorstellung.[9] The first comes to the mind of English-speakers whenever there is no explicit indication that another is intended. This concept is close to the notion of “picture” and as such involves the replication, in a physical or formal way, of something else that is categorized as “original”. The second concept is close to the notion of “conceptual construct”, and the German word for it, Vorstellung, is central in the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer. Maturana’s aversion against the word “representation” springs from the fact that, like Kant and Schopenhauer, he excludes conceptual pictures or replications of an objective, ontic reality in the cognitive domain of organisms. In contrast, re- presentations in Piaget’s sense are repetitions or reconstructions of items that were distinguished in previous experience. As Maturana explained in the course of the discussions at the ASC Conference in October 1988, such representations are possible also in the autopoietic model. Maturana spoke there of re-living an experience, and from my perspective this coincides with the concept of representation as Vorstellung, without which there could be no reflection. From that angle, then, it becomes clear that, in the autopoietic organism also, “expectations” are nothing but re-presentations of experiences that are now projected into the direction of the not-yet-experienced.

|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Distinguishing the Observer: An Attempt at Interpreting Maturana

|stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Distinguishing_the_Observer:_An_Attempt_at_Interpreting_Maturana

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|stationText=So kann zum Beispiel eine Frau ihrer Freundin entrüstet von einer Party berichten: „Stell Dir vor, die Irmgard kam in demselben Kleid wie ich!“; und der Sohn kann der Familie auf einer Ferienfahrt erklären: „Das ist das gleiche Auto, das uns schon vor dem Mittagessen vorgefahren ist.“ - Im ersten Fall sind es zwei Kleider, die sich in Bezug auf die Eigenschaften, die da maßgebend sind, nicht unterscheiden; im zweiten Fall hingegen handelt es sich um ein und dasselbe Auto. Anders ausgedrückt: Im ersten Fall wird auf Grund eines Vergleichs die Zugehörigkeit zweier Gegenstände zu einer bestimmten Klasse behauptet, im zweiten wird dem Gegenstand zweier zeitlich getrennter Erlebnisse individuelle Identität zugeschrieben.

|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie

|stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Die_Radikal-Konstruktivistische_Wissenstheorie