Difference between revisions of "Walk:SpracheWeltenlang"

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(Created page with "{{#subobject:TitleStation |stationId=1 |stationType=title |walkTitle=Sprachen sind Welten |subTitle=Ein Spaziergang für Eingelesene }} {{#subobject:ExplanationStation |stati...")
 
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|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Representation and Deduction  
 
|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Representation and Deduction  
 
|stationDocumentSourceURL=http://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Representation_and_Deduction
 
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|stationText=Be this as it may, my main interest is in devising theoretical principles that might show at least one way that could lead to these important competencies. De Saussure’s model makes very clear that the semantic connection in the first place links an individual’s generalized experience of words with the individual’s generalized experience of other items. For entities that have been generalized German provides the word “Vorstellung”, a word that is central in Kant’s analysis of reason. In English, it has traditionally been rendered by “representation”, and this was thoroughly misleading. In the English-speaker the word “representation” inevitably implies that somewhere there is an original which is now being represented. This interpretation makes it practically impossible to understand Kant’s theory of knowledge; and when it is applied to language it leads to the notion of “reference”, i.e. that words refer to objects in a world thought to be independent of the speakers. If you think about this, you sooner or later stumble over the question how you could possibly have established a semantic connection between a word and an object, if both are supposed to be independent of your experience. The answer becomes obvious in Saussure’s diagram: The semantic connection – one cannot repeat this often enough – can be made only between entities in someone’s head. Just as, for instance, the Morse code links short and long experiences of beeps to re-presentations of letters of the alphabet, so in language, sound images are linked to concepts, that is, to re-presentations of experiential units. The problem of meaning thus comes down to the problem of how we generate units in our experience such that we can associate them with words, and how we relate these units to form larger conceptual structures.
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|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics
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|stationDocumentSourceURL=http://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/How_Do_We_Mean_A_Constructivist_Sketch_of_Semantics
 
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Denn nich timmer nutzen wir dei Möglichkeiten, die uns unsere Sprachen zur Verfügung stellen.
 
Denn nich timmer nutzen wir dei Möglichkeiten, die uns unsere Sprachen zur Verfügung stellen.
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|stationText=Be this as it may, my main interest is in devising theoretical principles that might show at least one way that could lead to these important competencies. De Saussure’s model makes very clear that the semantic connection in the first place links an individual’s generalized experience of words with the individual’s generalized experience of other items. For entities that have been generalized German provides the word “Vorstellung”, a word that is central in Kant’s analysis of reason. In English, it has traditionally been rendered by “representation”, and this was thoroughly misleading. In the English-speaker the word “representation” inevitably implies that somewhere there is an original which is now being represented. This interpretation makes it practically impossible to understand Kant’s theory of knowledge; and when it is applied to language it leads to the notion of “reference”, i.e. that words refer to objects in a world thought to be independent of the speakers. If you think about this, you sooner or later stumble over the question how you could possibly have established a semantic connection between a word and an object, if both are supposed to be independent of your experience. The answer becomes obvious in Saussure’s diagram: The semantic connection – one cannot repeat this often enough – can be made only between entities in someone’s head. Just as, for instance, the Morse code links short and long experiences of beeps to re-presentations of letters of the alphabet, so in language, sound images are linked to concepts, that is, to re-presentations of experiential units. The problem of meaning thus comes down to the problem of how we generate units in our experience such that we can associate them with words, and how we relate these units to form larger conceptual structures.
 
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|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics
 
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Revision as of 16:44, 6 April 2020

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