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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lzzhreoq32","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":948°Ӻ,"quote":"The environment which, in Powers’ terms, is “emitted” by the first-order input functions of a perceiving organism can in no way be equated with what an observer of such a control system or organism would call the system’s environment. The observer makes the distinction between an organism and that organism’s environment as a distinction in his own field of experience. In terms of visual experience it is equivalent to any figure/ground distinction. For the organism itself, however, the first-order perceptual signals are “environment,” but only in the purely metaphorical sense that they constitute the raw material for all further neural computation. Seen from inside that organism – the organism we are observing – the dichotomy between it and its environment cannot possibly be made. “Environment” is not something such an organism can in any way derive from its proximal neural signals, it can be posited only by an observer of the organism","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321065832023118483012":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1591897891378°
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