Annotation Metadata
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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"S3mcwb7ywx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ41Ӻ","endOffset":438°Ӻ,"quote":"Given this active construction, it is an equivocation to speak of external objects in a real world. Objects and the world are both complex products of the organism’s system. The notion of an object is imposed upon the system by its own doing. Whatever may be the source of the lowest-level disturbance, without the organism’s combinatory effort they arc not “objects.” The world of middle-sized objects is constructed at the third levd and organized, by sequencing and establishing relations at the fourth and fifth levels. Hence, from the system’s point of view, there can not even be a conceptualization of causality below these levels, and that means that whatever we isolate as a “cause” or as an “effect” must be a construct of the third level or above and cannot represent an independent entity that “exists” outside the operations of the network. The system builds the notion of permanent object. The degree to which this is matched in some external environment is, by definition, not perceivable.\n\nThis means that we would be much safer in general to speak of sensation creating input functions rather than sensation recognizing functions. To speak of recognition implies tacitly that the environment contains an entity to be recognized, and that all we have to do is to learn to detect it. It seems far more realistic to me to speak instead of functions that construct perceptions. (William T. Powers 1973, p. 114)\nFor an organism, strictly speaking, there is no environment. This is only definable for an observer who within his field of experience constructs an organism and constructs an environment for that organism. It is senseless (literally) to place ourselves and our experiential world within an environment, i.e. to postulate a mysterious realm beyond our own signals into which we may project a noumenal origin of the invariances we compute.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210169141624291851422":^°°,^"jQuery3210169141624291851422":^°°,^"jQuery3210169141624291851422":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1592301952675°
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