Editing Annotation:Text:Knowing without Metaphysics: Aspects of the Radical Constructivist Position/Tgdwatj3rq

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|LastModificationDate=2019-07-01T14:09:14.819Z
|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler
|AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tgdwatj3rq","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ20Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","endOffset":669°Ӻ,"quote":"To perceive or recognize a book (or anything else) is to find something in one’s experiential field that fits one’s concept of ‘book’. It does not mean that a ‘real’ or ‘ontic’ object that is a book has to be there before one has seen it as a book. All it means is that in some part of our present experiential field there is the kind of raw material which, if coordinated in a particular way, is sufficiently close to what our concept of book demands, so that we accept it as an instantiation of that concept.\nTwo points have to be made clear in this context because they, too have led to misunderstandings. First, ‘concepts’, in my view, are not like picture postcards against which one matches experiential material rather, they are pathways of action or operation and they can either be completed with the experiential material at hand, or they cannot, and the rigor with which that completion is required and carried out always depends on the particular setting in which the activity takes place. The second point concerns what I have called the ‘raw material’. The ‘stuff’ on this lowest level of analysis is not something that lies about in an objective environment. It is no more, but also no less, than the totality of basic sensory elements or distinctions our system is able to generate.\nConcepts, therefore, have no iconic or representational connection with anything that might ‘exist’ outside the cognizing system; and the raw material out of which concepts are composed or coordinated cannot be known to have any such connection either. To call the basic elements of our cognitive conceptual constructions ‘distinctions’ is, I think, the least misleading way of speaking about them. From the distinguisher’s point of view, what is actually distinguished depends not on what might be there before the activity of distinguishing is carried out, but on what the organism is able to distinguish and chooses to distinguish in the given experiential context.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321080850240369413962":^°°,^"jQuery321080850240369413962":^°°,^"jQuery321080850240369413962":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1561982954365°
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