Difference between revisions of "Annotation:Text:Aspects of Constructivism/Axaejab0ij"
(Created page with "{{Innovationsdiskurs2}} {{TextAnnotation |AnnotationOf=Text:Aspects_of_Constructivism |LastModificationDate=2019-06-06T11:56:15.521Z |LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichl...") |
|||
| (One intermediate revision by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 2: | Line 2: | ||
{{TextAnnotation | {{TextAnnotation | ||
|AnnotationOf=Text:Aspects_of_Constructivism | |AnnotationOf=Text:Aspects_of_Constructivism | ||
| − | |LastModificationDate=2019-06- | + | |LastModificationDate=2019-06-24T19:16:49.233Z |
|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | |LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | ||
| − | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Axaejab0ij","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1734°Ӻ,"quote":"The key idea that sets constructivism apart from other theories of cognition was launched about sixty years ago by Jean Piaget. It was the idea that what we call knowledge does not and cannot have the purpose of producing representations of an independent reality, but has instead an adaptive function. This changed assessment of the cognitive activity entails an irrevocable break with the generally accepted epistemological tradition of Western civilization, according to which the knower must strive to attain a picture of the “real” world. While the revolutions in the physical sciences in this century have led to the realization that such a picture seems impossible even according to physical theory, most philosophers hang on to the belief that the progress of science will somehow lead to an approximation of the ultimate truth. Throughout the ages, however, there have been thinkers who did not share such a belief. Indeed, since the beginning of our history of ideas, the skeptics have formulated logically irrefutable arguments showing that if ”true” knowledge is to represent a real world it could not be attained. Although they provided constant irritation to the philosophical establishment, it was always easy to make their arguments seem absurd by mentioning some of the wonderful things human knowledge had achieved. In ancient times one could point to the accurate predictions concerning eclipses and the movement of celestial bodies in general, and in our days there are not only the miracles of technology we use in everyday life, but there is also the overwhelming fact that a man was able to land on the moon. In the face of such successes it would, indeed, be ridiculous to question the validity of knowledge.","highlights":Ӷ^" | + | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Axaejab0ij","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1734°Ӻ,"quote":"The key idea that sets constructivism apart from other theories of cognition was launched about sixty years ago by Jean Piaget. It was the idea that what we call knowledge does not and cannot have the purpose of producing representations of an independent reality, but has instead an adaptive function. This changed assessment of the cognitive activity entails an irrevocable break with the generally accepted epistemological tradition of Western civilization, according to which the knower must strive to attain a picture of the “real” world. While the revolutions in the physical sciences in this century have led to the realization that such a picture seems impossible even according to physical theory, most philosophers hang on to the belief that the progress of science will somehow lead to an approximation of the ultimate truth. Throughout the ages, however, there have been thinkers who did not share such a belief. Indeed, since the beginning of our history of ideas, the skeptics have formulated logically irrefutable arguments showing that if ”true” knowledge is to represent a real world it could not be attained. Although they provided constant irritation to the philosophical establishment, it was always easy to make their arguments seem absurd by mentioning some of the wonderful things human knowledge had achieved. In ancient times one could point to the accurate predictions concerning eclipses and the movement of celestial bodies in general, and in our days there are not only the miracles of technology we use in everyday life, but there is also the overwhelming fact that a man was able to land on the moon. In the face of such successes it would, indeed, be ridiculous to question the validity of knowledge.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210478005818437783562":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Innovationsdiskurs2","data_creacio":1559814973954° |
}} | }} | ||
{{Innovationstyp | {{Innovationstyp | ||
|field_text_autocomplete=Kritik an der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie | |field_text_autocomplete=Kritik an der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 18:16, 24 June 2019
| Annotation of | Text:Aspects_of_Constructivism |
|---|---|
| Annotation Comment | |
| Last Modification Date | 2019-06-24T19:16:49.233Z |
| Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
| Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Axaejab0ij","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1734°Ӻ,"quote":"The key idea that sets constructivism apart from other theories of cognition was launched about sixty years ago by Jean Piaget. It was the idea that what we call knowledge does not and cannot have the purpose of producing representations of an independent reality, but has instead an adaptive function. This changed assessment of the cognitive activity entails an irrevocable break with the generally accepted epistemological tradition of Western civilization, according to which the knower must strive to attain a picture of the “real” world. While the revolutions in the physical sciences in this century have led to the realization that such a picture seems impossible even according to physical theory, most philosophers hang on to the belief that the progress of science will somehow lead to an approximation of the ultimate truth. Throughout the ages, however, there have been thinkers who did not share such a belief. Indeed, since the beginning of our history of ideas, the skeptics have formulated logically irrefutable arguments showing that if ”true” knowledge is to represent a real world it could not be attained. Although they provided constant irritation to the philosophical establishment, it was always easy to make their arguments seem absurd by mentioning some of the wonderful things human knowledge had achieved. In ancient times one could point to the accurate predictions concerning eclipses and the movement of celestial bodies in general, and in our days there are not only the miracles of technology we use in everyday life, but there is also the overwhelming fact that a man was able to land on the moon. In the face of such successes it would, indeed, be ridiculous to question the validity of knowledge.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210478005818437783562":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Innovationsdiskurs2","data_creacio":1559814973954°
|
| Innovationstyp | Kritik an der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie |
|---|
