Difference between revisions of "Walk:SpracheWeltenlang"
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|walkTitle=Sprachen sind Welten | |walkTitle=Sprachen sind Welten | ||
| − | |subTitle=Ein Spaziergang für Eingelesene | + | | |
| + | subTitle=Ein Spaziergang für Eingelesene | ||
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|stationType=explanation | |stationType=explanation | ||
| − | |explanationText=Glasersfeld hatte ein spannendes Verhältnis zu Sprachen. Er war noch ein kleines Kind, als seine Familie aus München nach Meran zog. | + | |explanationText=Glasersfeld hatte ein spannendes Verhältnis zu Sprachen. Er war noch ein kleines Kind, als seine Familie aus München nach Meran zog. Zuhause sprachen die Glasersfelds Deutsch, in der Schule sprach Ernst Italienisch. Wenn seine Eltern nicht wollten, dass er sie verstand, sprachen sie Englisch - das motivierte den Buben, auch schon früh Englisch zu lernen. Im Internat kamen schließlich Französisch und Latein dazu. Der junge Glasersfeld erkannte dabei bald, dass verschiedene Sprachen auch unterschiedliche Zugänge zur Welt vermittelten. |
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| − | Wenn seine Eltern nicht wollten, dass er sie verstand, sprachen sie Englisch - das motivierte den Buben, auch schon früh Englisch zu lernen. | ||
| − | |||
| − | Im Internat kamen schließlich Französisch und Latein dazu. | ||
| − | |||
| − | Der junge Glasersfeld erkannte dabei bald, dass verschiedene Sprachen auch unterschiedliche Zugänge zur Welt vermittelten. | ||
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|stationId=3 | |stationId=3 | ||
|stationType=normal | |stationType=normal | ||
| − | |stationHeader=Glasersfeld | + | |stationHeader=Glasersfeld empfand die Unterschiede zwischen Sprachen als eine spannende Erfahrung. |
| − | |stationText=You cannot help realizing that the world a native speaker of, say, German experiences and talks about is noticeably different from the world of a native speaker of Italian; both their worlds are different again from those of a Frenchmen or a Briton – let alone a native speaker of American English. Even the everyday things a young man like myself might have been interested in – things supposed to be common to all languages, like cars, mountains, girls, and food – are not quite the same in the experiential worlds of speakers of different languages. Having noticed this, you also begin to suspect that the | + | |stationText=You cannot help realizing that the world a native speaker of, say, German experiences and talks about is noticeably different from the world of a native speaker of Italian; both their worlds are different again from those of a Frenchmen or a Briton – let alone a native speaker of American English. Even the everyday things a young man like myself might have been interested in – things supposed to be common to all languages, like cars, mountains, girls, and food – are not quite the same in the experiential worlds of speakers of different languages. Having noticed this, you also begin to suspect that the concepts associated with words are not the same from person to person in one and the same language. |
|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician | |stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician | ||
| − | |stationDocumentSourceURL= | + | |stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Why_I_Consider_Myself_a_Cybernetician |
|stationVideoURL= | |stationVideoURL= | ||
| − | |stationImageURL=https://pixabay.com/ | + | |stationImageURL=https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2018/05/10/16/52/machine-3388001_960_720.jpg |
| − | |stationConclusion=Diese Unterschiede drängen sich nicht auf. Es ist einiges an Wissen und Routine in einer Sprache notwendig, um sie zu entdecken. | + | |stationConclusion=Diese Unterschiede drängen sich nicht auf. Es ist einiges an Wissen und Routine in einer Sprache notwendig, um sie zu entdecken. |
}} | }} | ||
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|stationText=This in no way denies the fact that the continuous social and linguistic interactions among the members of a group or society lead to a progressive mutual adaptation of the individuals’ semantic connections. These interactions inevitably bring about the fact that the members of a language group tend to construct the meanings of words in ways that prove compatible with the usage of the community. This is to say, they develop a more or less common way of “seeing the world”. But what they see is nevertheless their subjective construction. That this is a viable assumption becomes clear the moment one considers more than one language. I can illustrate this by a simple example. English text books of linguistics frequently give “the boy hit the ball” as example of a simple sentence that contains a subject, a verb, and an object. In the British Isles this sentence usually calls forth the re-presentation of a boy armed with a tennis racket or a golf club. In the United States he will be imagined to hold a baseball bat. This is a very minor difference. However, if the sentence has to be translated into German, it turns out to be far more complicated. The translator has to know more about the situational context, because the “simple” sentence turns out to be ambiguous. It would be appropriate in several situations, each of which requires different words in German. Here are the four most likely ones: Fig.6: “The boy hits the ball” If the boy hits the ball with a racket, a club, or a bat, the German verb has to be schlagen; if he hits it with an arrow or a bullet, it would be treffen; if he hits it with his bicycle, it would be stossen plus the preposition auf; and if he hits the ball when falling from the balcony, it would be fallen … auf or schlagen … auf. None of these verbs could be used in any of the other three situations. The conceptual structures called up by the German verbs are more complex than the one called up by “to hit”. They all contain the meaning of the English verb, i.e. the construct of an object’s sudden impact with something else; but they also contain specifications of the event that are not part of the English meaning. As a result, English-speakers who want to express themselves in German must learn not only different words but also a different way of seeing the details of the relevant experiences. Between any two languages you might choose, there are innumerable differences of conceptualization. If they lie in the area of perceptual or sensorimotor construction, they sooner or later become noticeable and corrigible in practical situations of interaction. If, however, they are a matter of abstract conceptual construction, such as the meaning of the German word Vorstellung and that of the English word “representation”, they may cause lasting misinterpretation because their incompatibility rarely becomes apparent on the surface. I have chosen examples of the differential construction of meaning in different languages because they manifest themselves in the daily experience of anyone who lives in more than one language. But the meanings individual users of one and the same language construct are no more homogeneous. Although individuals necessarily adapt the meanings they associate with words to what they perceive to be the usage of the community, the stuff those meanings consist of is always part of their own subjective experience. Consequently it is misleading to speak of “shared” meanings. The four terms I mentioned in the abstract involve meaning in one way or another and tend to reinforce the notion that its structure is a well-known fixed entity. This, in my view, inevitably leads to trouble. What speakers of a language have constructed as the meanings of the words they use, is at best compatible in the linguistic interactions with other speakers; but such compatibility remains forever relative to the limited number of actual interactions the individual has had in his or her past. What speakers have learned to mean always remains their own construction. | |stationText=This in no way denies the fact that the continuous social and linguistic interactions among the members of a group or society lead to a progressive mutual adaptation of the individuals’ semantic connections. These interactions inevitably bring about the fact that the members of a language group tend to construct the meanings of words in ways that prove compatible with the usage of the community. This is to say, they develop a more or less common way of “seeing the world”. But what they see is nevertheless their subjective construction. That this is a viable assumption becomes clear the moment one considers more than one language. I can illustrate this by a simple example. English text books of linguistics frequently give “the boy hit the ball” as example of a simple sentence that contains a subject, a verb, and an object. In the British Isles this sentence usually calls forth the re-presentation of a boy armed with a tennis racket or a golf club. In the United States he will be imagined to hold a baseball bat. This is a very minor difference. However, if the sentence has to be translated into German, it turns out to be far more complicated. The translator has to know more about the situational context, because the “simple” sentence turns out to be ambiguous. It would be appropriate in several situations, each of which requires different words in German. Here are the four most likely ones: Fig.6: “The boy hits the ball” If the boy hits the ball with a racket, a club, or a bat, the German verb has to be schlagen; if he hits it with an arrow or a bullet, it would be treffen; if he hits it with his bicycle, it would be stossen plus the preposition auf; and if he hits the ball when falling from the balcony, it would be fallen … auf or schlagen … auf. None of these verbs could be used in any of the other three situations. The conceptual structures called up by the German verbs are more complex than the one called up by “to hit”. They all contain the meaning of the English verb, i.e. the construct of an object’s sudden impact with something else; but they also contain specifications of the event that are not part of the English meaning. As a result, English-speakers who want to express themselves in German must learn not only different words but also a different way of seeing the details of the relevant experiences. Between any two languages you might choose, there are innumerable differences of conceptualization. If they lie in the area of perceptual or sensorimotor construction, they sooner or later become noticeable and corrigible in practical situations of interaction. If, however, they are a matter of abstract conceptual construction, such as the meaning of the German word Vorstellung and that of the English word “representation”, they may cause lasting misinterpretation because their incompatibility rarely becomes apparent on the surface. I have chosen examples of the differential construction of meaning in different languages because they manifest themselves in the daily experience of anyone who lives in more than one language. But the meanings individual users of one and the same language construct are no more homogeneous. Although individuals necessarily adapt the meanings they associate with words to what they perceive to be the usage of the community, the stuff those meanings consist of is always part of their own subjective experience. Consequently it is misleading to speak of “shared” meanings. The four terms I mentioned in the abstract involve meaning in one way or another and tend to reinforce the notion that its structure is a well-known fixed entity. This, in my view, inevitably leads to trouble. What speakers of a language have constructed as the meanings of the words they use, is at best compatible in the linguistic interactions with other speakers; but such compatibility remains forever relative to the limited number of actual interactions the individual has had in his or her past. What speakers have learned to mean always remains their own construction. | ||
|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics | |stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics | ||
| − | |stationDocumentSourceURL= | + | |stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/How_Do_We_Mean_A_Constructivist_Sketch_of_Semantics |
|stationVideoURL= | |stationVideoURL= | ||
|stationImageURL= | |stationImageURL= | ||
|stationConclusion=In unterschiedlichen Sprachen werden also unterschiedliche Konzepte ausgedrückt, die sich in der Verwendung der Wörter und der Grammatik abbilden. | |stationConclusion=In unterschiedlichen Sprachen werden also unterschiedliche Konzepte ausgedrückt, die sich in der Verwendung der Wörter und der Grammatik abbilden. | ||
| − | Dabei finden sich konzeptuelle Unterschiede auch innerhalb einer Sprache zwsischen unterschiedlichen Srecherinnen und Sprechern. Die Bedeutungen und Konzepte bilden sich durch die Nutzung der Sprache heraus. Jeder Spreceher und jede Sprecherin bildet die erlebten und erfahrenen Konzepte in der eigenen Sprache ab | + | Dabei finden sich konzeptuelle Unterschiede auch innerhalb einer Sprache zwsischen unterschiedlichen Srecherinnen und Sprechern. Die Bedeutungen und Konzepte bilden sich durch die Nutzung der Sprache heraus. Jeder Spreceher und jede Sprecherin bildet die erlebten und erfahrenen Konzepte in der eigenen Sprache ab. |
}} | }} | ||
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|stationText=SHANNON’s mathematical theory (1948) confirmed that only directives of choice and combination could travel between communicators, but not the meanings that have to be selected and combined to interpret a message. Language users, therefore, build up their meanings on the basis of their individual experience, and the meanings remain subjective, no matter how much they become modified and homogenized through the subject’s interactions with other language users. From the constructivist point of view, meanings are conceptual structures and, as such, to a large extent influence the individual’s construction and organization of his or her experiential reality. | |stationText=SHANNON’s mathematical theory (1948) confirmed that only directives of choice and combination could travel between communicators, but not the meanings that have to be selected and combined to interpret a message. Language users, therefore, build up their meanings on the basis of their individual experience, and the meanings remain subjective, no matter how much they become modified and homogenized through the subject’s interactions with other language users. From the constructivist point of view, meanings are conceptual structures and, as such, to a large extent influence the individual’s construction and organization of his or her experiential reality. | ||
|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Constructivism in Education | |stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Constructivism in Education | ||
| − | |stationDocumentSourceURL= | + | |stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Constructivism_in_Education |
|stationVideoURL= | |stationVideoURL= | ||
|stationImageURL=https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/30/Sender-Empfänger-Modell_nach_Shannon_und_Weaver.jpg | |stationImageURL=https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/30/Sender-Empfänger-Modell_nach_Shannon_und_Weaver.jpg | ||
|stationConclusion=Das hat einen wesentlichen Einfluss darauf, wie wir im Alltag miteinander kommunizieren und welche Probleme dabei entstehen können. | |stationConclusion=Das hat einen wesentlichen Einfluss darauf, wie wir im Alltag miteinander kommunizieren und welche Probleme dabei entstehen können. | ||
| − | + | Vergleicht man Sprachen miteinander, fällt auf, dass manche Konzepte in der einen mit mehreren Begriffen beschrieben werden, während eine andere alle Aspekte in einem Wort zusammenfasst. | |
| − | Glasersfeld verwendet diese Begriffe und besonders die feinen Unterschiede zwischen Englisch, Deutsch und Italieneisch | + | Glasersfeld verwendet diese Begriffe und besonders die feinen Unterschiede zwischen Englisch, Deutsch und Italieneisch immer wieder auch in seiner Argumentation. |
}} | }} | ||
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|stationText=One misapprehension stems from the general notion of “representation.” As that term is used in psychology and cognitive development, it is ambiguous in more than one way. First, like many words ending in “-ion,” “representation” can indicate either an activity or its result. This ambiguity rarely creates difficulties. Far more serious is the epistemological ambiguity to which the word gives rise. It creates an unwholesome conceptual confusion. The distinction I want to make clear concerns two concepts which, for instance in German, are expressed by two words, Darstellung and Vorstellung; both are usually rendered in English by “representation.” The first designates an item that corresponds in an iconic sense to another item, an “original” to which it refers. The second designates a conceptual construct that has no explicit reference to something else of which it could be considered a replica or picture. (In fact, Vorstellung would be better translated into English as “idea” or “conception.”) Thus, if one uses the word in the second sense, it would help to spell it “re- presentation.” The hyphenated “re” could be taken to indicate repetition of something one has experienced before. This would lessen the illusion that mental re- presentations are replicas or images of objects in some “real” world. It would help to focus attention on the fact that what one re-presents to oneself is never an independent external entity but rather the re-play of a conceptual item one has derived from experience by means of some sort of abstraction.[3] | |stationText=One misapprehension stems from the general notion of “representation.” As that term is used in psychology and cognitive development, it is ambiguous in more than one way. First, like many words ending in “-ion,” “representation” can indicate either an activity or its result. This ambiguity rarely creates difficulties. Far more serious is the epistemological ambiguity to which the word gives rise. It creates an unwholesome conceptual confusion. The distinction I want to make clear concerns two concepts which, for instance in German, are expressed by two words, Darstellung and Vorstellung; both are usually rendered in English by “representation.” The first designates an item that corresponds in an iconic sense to another item, an “original” to which it refers. The second designates a conceptual construct that has no explicit reference to something else of which it could be considered a replica or picture. (In fact, Vorstellung would be better translated into English as “idea” or “conception.”) Thus, if one uses the word in the second sense, it would help to spell it “re- presentation.” The hyphenated “re” could be taken to indicate repetition of something one has experienced before. This would lessen the illusion that mental re- presentations are replicas or images of objects in some “real” world. It would help to focus attention on the fact that what one re-presents to oneself is never an independent external entity but rather the re-play of a conceptual item one has derived from experience by means of some sort of abstraction.[3] | ||
|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Representation and Deduction | |stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Representation and Deduction | ||
| − | |stationDocumentSourceURL= | + | |stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Representation_and_Deduction |
|stationVideoURL= | |stationVideoURL= | ||
|stationImageURL= | |stationImageURL= | ||
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|stationText=Be this as it may, my main interest is in devising theoretical principles that might show at least one way that could lead to these important competencies. De Saussure’s model makes very clear that the semantic connection in the first place links an individual’s generalized experience of words with the individual’s generalized experience of other items. For entities that have been generalized German provides the word “Vorstellung”, a word that is central in Kant’s analysis of reason. In English, it has traditionally been rendered by “representation”, and this was thoroughly misleading. In the English-speaker the word “representation” inevitably implies that somewhere there is an original which is now being represented. This interpretation makes it practically impossible to understand Kant’s theory of knowledge; and when it is applied to language it leads to the notion of “reference”, i.e. that words refer to objects in a world thought to be independent of the speakers. If you think about this, you sooner or later stumble over the question how you could possibly have established a semantic connection between a word and an object, if both are supposed to be independent of your experience. The answer becomes obvious in Saussure’s diagram: The semantic connection – one cannot repeat this often enough – can be made only between entities in someone’s head. Just as, for instance, the Morse code links short and long experiences of beeps to re-presentations of letters of the alphabet, so in language, sound images are linked to concepts, that is, to re-presentations of experiential units. The problem of meaning thus comes down to the problem of how we generate units in our experience such that we can associate them with words, and how we relate these units to form larger conceptual structures. | |stationText=Be this as it may, my main interest is in devising theoretical principles that might show at least one way that could lead to these important competencies. De Saussure’s model makes very clear that the semantic connection in the first place links an individual’s generalized experience of words with the individual’s generalized experience of other items. For entities that have been generalized German provides the word “Vorstellung”, a word that is central in Kant’s analysis of reason. In English, it has traditionally been rendered by “representation”, and this was thoroughly misleading. In the English-speaker the word “representation” inevitably implies that somewhere there is an original which is now being represented. This interpretation makes it practically impossible to understand Kant’s theory of knowledge; and when it is applied to language it leads to the notion of “reference”, i.e. that words refer to objects in a world thought to be independent of the speakers. If you think about this, you sooner or later stumble over the question how you could possibly have established a semantic connection between a word and an object, if both are supposed to be independent of your experience. The answer becomes obvious in Saussure’s diagram: The semantic connection – one cannot repeat this often enough – can be made only between entities in someone’s head. Just as, for instance, the Morse code links short and long experiences of beeps to re-presentations of letters of the alphabet, so in language, sound images are linked to concepts, that is, to re-presentations of experiential units. The problem of meaning thus comes down to the problem of how we generate units in our experience such that we can associate them with words, and how we relate these units to form larger conceptual structures. | ||
|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics | |stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics | ||
| − | |stationDocumentSourceURL= | + | |stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/How_Do_We_Mean_A_Constructivist_Sketch_of_Semantics |
|stationVideoURL= | |stationVideoURL= | ||
|stationImageURL= | |stationImageURL= | ||
| − | |stationConclusion=Wie sich diese Schwierigkeit auf die Übersetzung von Emanuel Kants Werke auswirkte und warum Maturana nicht smit dieser Übersetzung anfangen konnte, erklärt Glasersfeld so: | + | |stationConclusion=Wie sich diese Schwierigkeit auf die Übersetzung von Emanuel Kants Werke auswirkte und warum Maturana nicht smit dieser Übersetzung anfangen konnte, erklärt Glasersfeld so: |
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|stationText=Given that Maturana, at various places in his writings, makes it very clear that he considers unacceptable the concept that is usually linked with the word “representation”, it may surprise one at first that, in the passage quoted here, he bases a discrimination of conversations on “expectations”. In my analysis, to have an expectation means to represent to oneself something that one has not yet isolated by means of distinctions in the present flow of actual experience. The apparent contradiction disappears, however, if one considers that the English word “representation” is used to designate several different concepts, two among which are designated in German by the two words Darstellung and Vorstellung.[9] The first comes to the mind of English-speakers whenever there is no explicit indication that another is intended. This concept is close to the notion of “picture” and as such involves the replication, in a physical or formal way, of something else that is categorized as “original”. The second concept is close to the notion of “conceptual construct”, and the German word for it, Vorstellung, is central in the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer. Maturana’s aversion against the word “representation” springs from the fact that, like Kant and Schopenhauer, he excludes conceptual pictures or replications of an objective, ontic reality in the cognitive domain of organisms. In contrast, re- presentations in Piaget’s sense are repetitions or reconstructions of items that were distinguished in previous experience. As Maturana explained in the course of the discussions at the ASC Conference in October 1988, such representations are possible also in the autopoietic model. Maturana spoke there of re-living an experience, and from my perspective this coincides with the concept of representation as Vorstellung, without which there could be no reflection. From that angle, then, it becomes clear that, in the autopoietic organism also, “expectations” are nothing but re-presentations of experiences that are now projected into the direction of the not-yet-experienced. | |stationText=Given that Maturana, at various places in his writings, makes it very clear that he considers unacceptable the concept that is usually linked with the word “representation”, it may surprise one at first that, in the passage quoted here, he bases a discrimination of conversations on “expectations”. In my analysis, to have an expectation means to represent to oneself something that one has not yet isolated by means of distinctions in the present flow of actual experience. The apparent contradiction disappears, however, if one considers that the English word “representation” is used to designate several different concepts, two among which are designated in German by the two words Darstellung and Vorstellung.[9] The first comes to the mind of English-speakers whenever there is no explicit indication that another is intended. This concept is close to the notion of “picture” and as such involves the replication, in a physical or formal way, of something else that is categorized as “original”. The second concept is close to the notion of “conceptual construct”, and the German word for it, Vorstellung, is central in the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer. Maturana’s aversion against the word “representation” springs from the fact that, like Kant and Schopenhauer, he excludes conceptual pictures or replications of an objective, ontic reality in the cognitive domain of organisms. In contrast, re- presentations in Piaget’s sense are repetitions or reconstructions of items that were distinguished in previous experience. As Maturana explained in the course of the discussions at the ASC Conference in October 1988, such representations are possible also in the autopoietic model. Maturana spoke there of re-living an experience, and from my perspective this coincides with the concept of representation as Vorstellung, without which there could be no reflection. From that angle, then, it becomes clear that, in the autopoietic organism also, “expectations” are nothing but re-presentations of experiences that are now projected into the direction of the not-yet-experienced. | ||
|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Distinguishing the Observer: An Attempt at Interpreting Maturana | |stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Distinguishing the Observer: An Attempt at Interpreting Maturana | ||
| − | |stationDocumentSourceURL= | + | |stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Distinguishing_the_Observer:_An_Attempt_at_Interpreting_Maturana |
|stationVideoURL= | |stationVideoURL= | ||
|stationImageURL=https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2017/02/04/12/25/man-2037255_1280.jpg | |stationImageURL=https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2017/02/04/12/25/man-2037255_1280.jpg | ||
| − | |stationConclusion=Aber nicht nur ein Vergleich verschiedener | + | |stationConclusion=Aber nicht nur ein Vergleich verschiedener Sprachen erscheint ihm wichtig. Glasersfeld betrachtet auch Unterschiede in einer Sprache und nicht zuletzt, wie wir als Sprecherinnen und Sprecher mit diesen Unterschieden und Feinheiten umgehen. |
| − | Denn nich timmer nutzen wir | + | Denn nich timmer nutzen wir die Möglichkeiten, die uns unsere Sprachen zur Verfügung stellen. |
}} | }} | ||
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|stationText=So kann zum Beispiel eine Frau ihrer Freundin entrüstet von einer Party berichten: „Stell Dir vor, die Irmgard kam in demselben Kleid wie ich!“; und der Sohn kann der Familie auf einer Ferienfahrt erklären: „Das ist das gleiche Auto, das uns schon vor dem Mittagessen vorgefahren ist.“ - Im ersten Fall sind es zwei Kleider, die sich in Bezug auf die Eigenschaften, die da maßgebend sind, nicht unterscheiden; im zweiten Fall hingegen handelt es sich um ein und dasselbe Auto. Anders ausgedrückt: Im ersten Fall wird auf Grund eines Vergleichs die Zugehörigkeit zweier Gegenstände zu einer bestimmten Klasse behauptet, im zweiten wird dem Gegenstand zweier zeitlich getrennter Erlebnisse individuelle Identität zugeschrieben. | |stationText=So kann zum Beispiel eine Frau ihrer Freundin entrüstet von einer Party berichten: „Stell Dir vor, die Irmgard kam in demselben Kleid wie ich!“; und der Sohn kann der Familie auf einer Ferienfahrt erklären: „Das ist das gleiche Auto, das uns schon vor dem Mittagessen vorgefahren ist.“ - Im ersten Fall sind es zwei Kleider, die sich in Bezug auf die Eigenschaften, die da maßgebend sind, nicht unterscheiden; im zweiten Fall hingegen handelt es sich um ein und dasselbe Auto. Anders ausgedrückt: Im ersten Fall wird auf Grund eines Vergleichs die Zugehörigkeit zweier Gegenstände zu einer bestimmten Klasse behauptet, im zweiten wird dem Gegenstand zweier zeitlich getrennter Erlebnisse individuelle Identität zugeschrieben. | ||
|stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie | |stationDocumentSourceTitle=Source: Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie | ||
| − | |stationDocumentSourceURL= | + | |stationDocumentSourceURL=https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Die_Radikal-Konstruktivistische_Wissenstheorie |
|stationVideoURL= | |stationVideoURL= | ||
|stationImageURL=https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2019/09/03/08/17/girls-4448933_1280.jpg | |stationImageURL=https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2019/09/03/08/17/girls-4448933_1280.jpg | ||
|stationConclusion=Nicht immer verwenden wir diese Worte im Alltag auch richtig, aber im Deutschen lassen sich diese Konzepte gut ausdrücken. | |stationConclusion=Nicht immer verwenden wir diese Worte im Alltag auch richtig, aber im Deutschen lassen sich diese Konzepte gut ausdrücken. | ||
| − | Auch Italienisch und Französisch kann dasselbe und das Gleiche unterscheiden, während im | + | Auch Italienisch und Französisch kann dasselbe und das Gleiche unterscheiden, während im Englischen beide Gegebenheiten mit "the same car and the same dress" ausgedrückt werden. |
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|stationType=conclusion | |stationType=conclusion | ||
|conclusionHeader=Sprache und Konzepte | |conclusionHeader=Sprache und Konzepte | ||
| − | | | + | |conclusionText=Glasersfeld arbeitet sehr bewusst mit Sprache und unterschiedlichen Begriffen. Diese sind für ihn ganz eng mit Konzepten verbunden, die innerhalb einer Sprache variieren können, weil Sprecherinnen und Sprecher sie immer wieder selbst neu konstruieren müssen. |
| − | conclusionText=Glasersfeld arbeitet sehr bewusst mit Sprache und unterschiedlichen Begriffen. Diese sind für ihn ganz eng mit Konzepten verbunden, die innerhalb einer Sprache variieren können, weil Sprecherinnen und Sprecher sie immer wieder selbst neu konstruieren müssen. | + | |stationVideoURL= |
| + | |stationImageURL= | ||
}} | }} | ||
