Difference between revisions of "Annotation:Text:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/U49v1tv0kx"

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(Created page with "{{Argumentation2}} {{TextAnnotation |AnnotationOf=Text:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation |LastModificationDate=2019-12-11T14:16:19.098Z |LastModificationUser=User:Sarah...")
 
 
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|LastModificationDate=2019-12-11T14:16:19.098Z
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|LastModificationDate=2019-12-11T14:16:36.459Z
 
|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler
 
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|AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"U49v1tv0kx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":1347°Ӻ,"quote":"The notion of change seems to go back to the very beginnings of human conceptualization. It must have been a commonplace notion already in the days of Heraclitus, who placed it at the foundation of the experiential world. A quotation from the famous fragments of his philosophy is usually given as “one cannot step twice into the same river”. In fact it continues, “for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you”.Ӷ5Ӻ  Taken in its completeness, it is a perfect metaphor of ‘change’. It shows that the concept requires at least two experiences, an item that is identical in both, (the same river), and a difference (the water that is not the same in the second experience). If no difference is noticed, and we find whatever properties we related to the item in the first experience related to it also in the second, we would conceive the combination as a state. (Stretching the metaphor: One can step twice into the same puddle.)  \nAccording to this break-down, change is a relational concept and, as such, requires more than one segment of experience, as well as a comparison. It also manifests what I consider a basic presupposition of all conceptual analysis: Segments of experience, insofar as they reach the level of conceptualization and rational description, always appear sequential. This sequence is usually interpreted as a temporal one.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1576070178634°
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|AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"U49v1tv0kx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":1347°Ӻ,"quote":"The notion of change seems to go back to the very beginnings of human conceptualization. It must have been a commonplace notion already in the days of Heraclitus, who placed it at the foundation of the experiential world. A quotation from the famous fragments of his philosophy is usually given as “one cannot step twice into the same river”. In fact it continues, “for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you”.Ӷ5Ӻ  Taken in its completeness, it is a perfect metaphor of ‘change’. It shows that the concept requires at least two experiences, an item that is identical in both, (the same river), and a difference (the water that is not the same in the second experience). If no difference is noticed, and we find whatever properties we related to the item in the first experience related to it also in the second, we would conceive the combination as a state. (Stretching the metaphor: One can step twice into the same puddle.)  \nAccording to this break-down, change is a relational concept and, as such, requires more than one segment of experience, as well as a comparison. It also manifests what I consider a basic presupposition of all conceptual analysis: Segments of experience, insofar as they reach the level of conceptualization and rational description, always appear sequential. This sequence is usually interpreted as a temporal one.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1576070178634°
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Latest revision as of 14:16, 11 December 2019

Annotation of Text:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2019-12-11T14:16:36.459Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"U49v1tv0kx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":1347°Ӻ,"quote":"The notion of change seems to go back to the very beginnings of human conceptualization. It must have been a commonplace notion already in the days of Heraclitus, who placed it at the foundation of the experiential world. A quotation from the famous fragments of his philosophy is usually given as “one cannot step twice into the same river”. In fact it continues, “for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you”.Ӷ5Ӻ   Taken in its completeness, it is a perfect metaphor of ‘change’. It shows that the concept requires at least two experiences, an item that is identical in both, (the same river), and a difference (the water that is not the same in the second experience). If no difference is noticed, and we find whatever properties we related to the item in the first experience related to it also in the second, we would conceive the combination as a state. (Stretching the metaphor: One can step twice into the same puddle.)  \nAccording to this break-down, change is a relational concept and, as such, requires more than one segment of experience, as well as a comparison. It also manifests what I consider a basic presupposition of all conceptual analysis: Segments of experience, insofar as they reach the level of conceptualization and rational description, always appear sequential. This sequence is usually interpreted as a temporal one.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°,^"jQuery3210180283158760955242":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1576070178634°
Thema Erfahrung
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