Difference between revisions of "Annotation:Text:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Aziwtob4ls"
| Line 2: | Line 2: | ||
{{TextAnnotation | {{TextAnnotation | ||
|AnnotationOf=Text:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach | |AnnotationOf=Text:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach | ||
| − | + | |LastModificationDate=2019-07-23T10:07:00.387Z | |
| − | |LastModificationDate=2019- | ||
|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | |LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | ||
| − | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Aziwtob4ls","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":1732°Ӻ,"quote":"No act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction. In this requirement, representation is similar to recognition. Both often work hand in hand, e.g., when one recognizes a Volkswagen though one can see only part of its back but is nevertheless able to visualize the whole. The ability to recognize a thing in one’s perceptual field, however, does not necessarily bring with it the ability to re-present it spontaneously. We have all had occasion to notice this. Our experiential world contains many things which, although we recognize them when we see them, are not available to us when we want to visualize them. There are, for instance, people whom we would recognize as acquaintances when we meet them, but were we asked to describe them when they are not in our visual field, we would be unable to recall an adequate image of their appearance. The fact that recognition developmentally precedes the ability to re-present an experiential item spontaneously, has been observed in many areas. It is probably best known and documented as the difference between what linguists call “passive” and “active” vocabulary. The difference is conspicuous in second-language learners but it is noticeable also in anyone’s first language: a good many words one knows when one hears or reads them are not available when one is speaking or writing. This lag suggests that having abstracted a concept that may serve to recognize and categorize a perceptual item is not sufficient to re-present the item to oneself in its absence.","highlights":Ӷ^" | + | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Aziwtob4ls","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":1732°Ӻ,"quote":"No act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction. In this requirement, representation is similar to recognition. Both often work hand in hand, e.g., when one recognizes a Volkswagen though one can see only part of its back but is nevertheless able to visualize the whole. The ability to recognize a thing in one’s perceptual field, however, does not necessarily bring with it the ability to re-present it spontaneously. We have all had occasion to notice this. Our experiential world contains many things which, although we recognize them when we see them, are not available to us when we want to visualize them. There are, for instance, people whom we would recognize as acquaintances when we meet them, but were we asked to describe them when they are not in our visual field, we would be unable to recall an adequate image of their appearance. The fact that recognition developmentally precedes the ability to re-present an experiential item spontaneously, has been observed in many areas. It is probably best known and documented as the difference between what linguists call “passive” and “active” vocabulary. The difference is conspicuous in second-language learners but it is noticeable also in anyone’s first language: a good many words one knows when one hears or reads them are not available when one is speaking or writing. This lag suggests that having abstracted a concept that may serve to recognize and categorize a perceptual item is not sufficient to re-present the item to oneself in its absence.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321080825956795460292":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560426974685° |
}} | }} | ||
{{Thema | {{Thema | ||
|field_text_autocomplete=Erfahrung | |field_text_autocomplete=Erfahrung | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 09:07, 23 July 2019
| Annotation of | Text:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach |
|---|---|
| Annotation Comment | |
| Last Modification Date | 2019-07-23T10:07:00.387Z |
| Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
| Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Aziwtob4ls","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":1732°Ӻ,"quote":"No act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction. In this requirement, representation is similar to recognition. Both often work hand in hand, e.g., when one recognizes a Volkswagen though one can see only part of its back but is nevertheless able to visualize the whole. The ability to recognize a thing in one’s perceptual field, however, does not necessarily bring with it the ability to re-present it spontaneously. We have all had occasion to notice this. Our experiential world contains many things which, although we recognize them when we see them, are not available to us when we want to visualize them. There are, for instance, people whom we would recognize as acquaintances when we meet them, but were we asked to describe them when they are not in our visual field, we would be unable to recall an adequate image of their appearance. The fact that recognition developmentally precedes the ability to re-present an experiential item spontaneously, has been observed in many areas. It is probably best known and documented as the difference between what linguists call “passive” and “active” vocabulary. The difference is conspicuous in second-language learners but it is noticeable also in anyone’s first language: a good many words one knows when one hears or reads them are not available when one is speaking or writing. This lag suggests that having abstracted a concept that may serve to recognize and categorize a perceptual item is not sufficient to re-present the item to oneself in its absence.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321080825956795460292":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560426974685°
|
| Thema | Erfahrung |
|---|
