Difference between revisions of "Annotation:Text:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Rxy13midl3"
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|AnnotationOf=Text:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach | |AnnotationOf=Text:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach | ||
− | |LastModificationDate=2019-07- | + | |LastModificationDate=2019-07-26T12:13:45.558Z |
|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | |LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | ||
− | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rxy13midl3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":2207,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":3166°Ӻ,"quote":"In short, in order to recognize several particular experiential items, in spite of differences they may manifest, as belonging to the same kind, we must have a concept that is flexible enough to allow for a certain variability. That is, instead of specific particulars it must contain variables. Yet it is clear that, in order to “imagine” for instance an apple, we have to decide what color it is to be, because we cannot possibly visualize it red or green or yellow at one and the same time. Berkeley, therefore, was right when he observed that whenever we re-present a concept to ourselves, we find that it is a particular thing and not a general idea. What he did not realize was that the abstraction necessary to recognize things of a kind, does not automatically turn into an image that can be re-presented. The situation, however, is somewhat complicated by our ability to use symbols, but before considering this I want to deal with re- presentation.","highlights":Ӷ^" | + | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rxy13midl3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":2207,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":3166°Ӻ,"quote":"In short, in order to recognize several particular experiential items, in spite of differences they may manifest, as belonging to the same kind, we must have a concept that is flexible enough to allow for a certain variability. That is, instead of specific particulars it must contain variables. Yet it is clear that, in order to “imagine” for instance an apple, we have to decide what color it is to be, because we cannot possibly visualize it red or green or yellow at one and the same time. Berkeley, therefore, was right when he observed that whenever we re-present a concept to ourselves, we find that it is a particular thing and not a general idea. What he did not realize was that the abstraction necessary to recognize things of a kind, does not automatically turn into an image that can be re-presented. The situation, however, is somewhat complicated by our ability to use symbols, but before considering this I want to deal with re- presentation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560419877622° |
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Latest revision as of 11:13, 26 July 2019
Annotation of | Text:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach |
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Annotation Comment | |
Last Modification Date | 2019-07-26T12:13:45.558Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rxy13midl3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":2207,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":3166°Ӻ,"quote":"In short, in order to recognize several particular experiential items, in spite of differences they may manifest, as belonging to the same kind, we must have a concept that is flexible enough to allow for a certain variability. That is, instead of specific particulars it must contain variables. Yet it is clear that, in order to “imagine” for instance an apple, we have to decide what color it is to be, because we cannot possibly visualize it red or green or yellow at one and the same time. Berkeley, therefore, was right when he observed that whenever we re-present a concept to ourselves, we find that it is a particular thing and not a general idea. What he did not realize was that the abstraction necessary to recognize things of a kind, does not automatically turn into an image that can be re-presented. The situation, however, is somewhat complicated by our ability to use symbols, but before considering this I want to deal with re- presentation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560419877622°
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