Annotation:The Construction of Knowledge/P9zy7ix2kf
< Annotation:The Construction of Knowledge
Revision as of 09:15, 7 March 2019 by Sarah Oberbichler (talk | contribs)
Thema | Wissen |
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Annotation of | The_Construction_of_Knowledge |
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Annotation Comment | Wir können Dinge unterscheiden, weil wir "Informationen" der sogenannten "Außenwelt" erhalten. |
Last Modification Date | 2019-03-07T09:15:16.360Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P9zy7ix2kf","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":402,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":2020°Ӻ,"quote":"About thirty years ago, Heinz von Foerster noticed an inherent quality of the\nnervous system (and almost everybody believes that human beings must be viewed as\nnervous systems when one focuses on cognition): The signals that are sent from\nsensory elements to the cortex are all the same. This had been discovered by Johannes\nMüller around the middle of the last century, but von Foerster was, as far as I know,\nthe first to emphasize its epistemological implications.\nHe called this “undifferentiated coding”.1 What this means is that if a neuron in\nthe retina sends a “visual” signal to the cortex, this signal has exactly the same form as\nthe signals that come from the ears, from the nose, from fingers or toes, or any other\nsignal-generating part of the organism. There is no qualitative distinction between any\nof these signals. They all vary in frequency and amplitude, but there is no qualitative\nindication of what they are supposed to mean.\nIt was a very baffling observation. It has since been confirmed by Humberto\nMaturana in the field of color vision, where he has shown that the receptors which are\nsupposed to sense red – or what physicists think of as the kind of light waves we call\nred – send signals that are in no way different from the ones that sense green. If we\nare able to distinguish them, the distinctions must be made in the cortex. Yet, they\ncannot be made on the basis of simple qualitative differences, because there are no\nsuch differences.2 It is therefore unwarranted to maintain that we distinguish things\nbecause we receive “information” from what we usually call the outside world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079803379306672152":^°°,^"jQuery321079803379306672152":^°°,^"jQuery321079803379306672152":^°°,^"jQuery321079803379306672152":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Wir können Dinge unterscheiden, weil wir \"Informationen\" der sogenannten \"Außenwelt\" erhalten. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1548690976238°
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