Annotation:Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Camouqfaz8
< Annotation:Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach
Revision as of 08:39, 23 July 2019 by Sarah Oberbichler (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{Schlussfolgerung3}} {{TextAnnotation |AnnotationOf=Annotationen:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach |Las...")
Annotation of | Annotationen:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach |
---|---|
Annotation Comment | |
Last Modification Date | 2019-07-23T09:39:07.824Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Camouqfaz8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":4330,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":5100°Ӻ,"quote":"Any re-presentation, be it of an experiential “thing” or of a program of actions or operations, requires some sensory material for its execution. That basic condition, I believe, is what confirmed Berkeley in his argument against the “existence” of abstracted general ideas, for it is indeed the case that every time we re-present to ourselves such a general idea, it turns into a particular one because its implementation requires the kind of material from which it was abstracted. This last condition could be reformulated by saying that there has to be some isomorphism between the present construct and what it is intended to reconstruct. Clearly, this isomorphism does not concern a “thing-in-itself” but precisely those aspects one wants to or happens to focus on.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563867546874°
|