Annotation:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge/Crvr6cy1yd
< Annotation:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge
Revision as of 18:06, 2 July 2019 by Sarah Oberbichler (talk | contribs)
Thema | Realität |
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Annotation of | The_Concepts_of_Adaptation_and_Viability_in_a_Radical_Constructivist_Theory_of_Knowledge |
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Annotation Comment | Es gibt keinen Ausweg aus der Annahme, dass Organismen ihre Welt konstruieren. |
Last Modification Date | 2019-07-02T19:05:19.937Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Crvr6cy1yd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":329,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":326°Ӻ,"quote":"If the individual belongs to our culture and is of a scientific bent, he or she will not be satisfied with introspection but will begin to observe other organisms in order to find out how these organisms come to know their environment, which they tacitly but erroneously equate with the world (von Glasersfeld, 1976). Because one cannot really get inside the organism that is being observed, one eventually formulates or builds some kind of a model of this process of “knowing.” That is what students of perception and the neurosciences in general have been doing and are doing. According to the more or less accepted contemporary models, there are “receptors,” “firings,” and “neural networks” or “fields” that compute a “representation” out of the firings. In the present context we can say that it is irrelevant whether or not the investigator then claims that the organism’s representation is functionally equivalent to, isomorphic with, or, simply, a picture of “the real world” —whatever an observer says of it, there can be no doubt about the fact that the organism has to construct a representation out of such proximal data as it has. In the case of the neuronal model these proximal data are small elementary events referred to as “firings of neurons.” As Hebb (1958) wrote: “At a certain level of physiological analysis there is no reality but the firing of single neurons Ӷp. 461Ӻ.”\nIt seems, then, that there is simply no way around the assumption that organisms construct their representations of their world, their environment, or whatever one chooses to call what is outside them. In other words, an activity of construction has to be assumed regardless of whether one wants to be a constructivist or not.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321046483296082791262":^°,"sizzle1562086987058":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ8194,31,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321046483296082791262":^°,"sizzle1562086987058":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ8591,31,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Es gibt keinen Ausweg aus der Annahme, dass Organismen ihre Welt konstruieren. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1553873750484°
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