Annotationen:Learning and Adaptation in the Theory of Constructivism
Argumentation2
In everyday language the difference between the terms learning and adaptation is sometimes blurred because both refer to a fundamental requirement. If we were not adapted to our environment, we would be unable to survive, and if we could not learn, we would die of our mistakes. For the biologist, however, there is an important difference: adaptation refers to the biological make-up, the genetically determined potential with which we are born; and learning is the process that allows us to build up skills in acting and thinking as a result of our own experience. Another way of bringing out this difference would be to explain that biological adaptation is the result of accidental mutations in the genes that determine possibilities of development, whereas learning can be engaged in deliberately in view of goals that we or others choose. This means that learning is an activity that we, consciously or unconsciously, have to carry out ourselves. In contrast, the basic meaning of adaptation is not an activity of organisms or species.
In everyday language the difference between the terms learning and adaptation is sometimes blurred because both refer to a fundamental requirement. If we were not adapted to our environment, we would be unable to survive, and if we could not learn, we would die of our mistakes. For the biologist, however, there is an important difference: adaptation refers to the biological make-up, the genetically determined potential with which we are born; and learning is the process that allows us to build up skills in acting and thinking as a result of our own experience. Another way of bringing out this difference would be to explain that biological adaptation is the result of accidental mutations in the genes that determine possibilities of development, whereas learning can be engaged in deliberately in view of goals that we or others choose. This means that learning is an activity that we, consciously or unconsciously, have to carry out ourselves. In contrast, the basic meaning of adaptation is not an activity of organisms or species.
Argumentation2
What further tends to mislead about the biological meaning of the term adaptation, is its definition as the outcome of a process called natural selection. This seems to relate the process to the deliberate, goal-directed selecting that is done, for example, by breeders of dogs or horses. Natural selection, in contrast, happens quite aimlessly as the result of changes in the environment which simply wipe out all those that do not have the characteristics necessary for survival. In this context one should emphasize the fact that the characteristics that enable an organism to survive a given environmental change, have to be present in the organism before that change occurs; and since the theory of evolution holds that modifications of the genetic make-up must be caused by mutations, the adaptedness of living organisms can be credited only to accidental variations.[1]
What further tends to mislead about the biological meaning of the term adaptation, is its definition as the outcome of a process called natural selection. This seems to relate the process to the deliberate, goal-directed selecting that is done, for example, by breeders of dogs or horses. Natural selection, in contrast, happens quite aimlessly as the result of changes in the environment which simply wipe out all those that do not have the characteristics necessary for survival. In this context one should emphasize the fact that the characteristics that enable an organism to survive a given environmental change, have to be present in the organism before that change occurs; and since the theory of evolution holds that modifications of the genetic make-up must be caused by mutations, the adaptedness of living organisms can be credited only to accidental variations.[1]
Argumentation2
Piaget started out as a biologist and began to investigate what he considered to be manifestations of ‘intelligence’ (using the term in a wider sense than is usual). It began with his early discovery that mollusks of the same species were able to produce offspring that developed different and appropriately shaped shells, if they were transplanted from still to fast-flowing water or vice versa. It was a change of physical structure that did not involve a change in the mollusks’ genetic make-up. He saw this as the effect of environmental constraints that foreclosed all but the viable developmental possibilities of the organism. Hence it was a form of adaptation that was closer to learning — the natural selection that produced it did not eliminate other potential developmental pathways in the genome, but only in the individual mollusks in question. Their offspring, if placed in another environment, could develop different shells which, relative to the new constraints, were again adapted. Seen in this way, the concept of adaptation could be incorporated in a theory of learning. In my view, this is the major contribution Jean Piaget has made to our understanding of cognition. Eventually this perspective led him to the conclusion that the function of intelligence was not, as traditional epistemology held, to provide cognitive organisms with ‘true’ representations of an objective environment. Rather, he began to see cognition as generator of intelligent tools that enable organisms to construct a relative fit with the world as they experience it.
Piaget started out as a biologist and began to investigate what he considered to be manifestations of ‘intelligence’ (using the term in a wider sense than is usual). It began with his early discovery that mollusks of the same species were able to produce offspring that developed different and appropriately shaped shells, if they were transplanted from still to fast-flowing water or vice versa. It was a change of physical structure that did not involve a change in the mollusks’ genetic make-up. He saw this as the effect of environmental constraints that foreclosed all but the viable developmental possibilities of the organism. Hence it was a form of adaptation that was closer to learning — the natural selection that produced it did not eliminate other potential developmental pathways in the genome, but only in the individual mollusks in question. Their offspring, if placed in another environment, could develop different shells which, relative to the new constraints, were again adapted. Seen in this way, the concept of adaptation could be incorporated in a theory of learning. In my view, this is the major contribution Jean Piaget has made to our understanding of cognition. Eventually this perspective led him to the conclusion that the function of intelligence was not, as traditional epistemology held, to provide cognitive organisms with ‘true’ representations of an objective environment. Rather, he began to see cognition as generator of intelligent tools that enable organisms to construct a relative fit with the world as they experience it.
Argumentation2
As a biologist, Piaget was well acquainted with the notion of reflex and he investigated the phenomenon in his children. Since infants manifest some such ‘fixed action patterns’ as soon as they are born, they must be considered the result of genetic determination rather than learning. Whereas most developmental psychologists seemed satisfied with that explanation, Piaget focused on the fact that this genetic determination was likely to be the result of natural selection. In other words, he considered that these action patterns arose through accidental mutations and spread, because they, rather than others, had consequences that were conducive to survival. He therefore saw reflexes not as they are usually depicted in textbooks, viz.:
As a biologist, Piaget was well acquainted with the notion of reflex and he investigated the phenomenon in his children. Since infants manifest some such ‘fixed action patterns’ as soon as they are born, they must be considered the result of genetic determination rather than learning. Whereas most developmental psychologists seemed satisfied with that explanation, Piaget focused on the fact that this genetic determination was likely to be the result of natural selection. In other words, he considered that these action patterns arose through accidental mutations and spread, because they, rather than others, had consequences that were conducive to survival. He therefore saw reflexes not as they are usually depicted in textbooks, viz.:
STIMULUS → ACTIVITY (RESPONSE) but as composed of three rather than two parts. The third part was the result of the activity that was crucial for the perpetuation of the reflex. On the basis of the organism’s past experience, this result could be expected, and thus open the way to cognitive applications: 1 2 3 PERCEIVED → ACTIVITY → BENEFICIAL or SITUATION EXPECTED RESULT
This addition was legitimate because, although reflexive action patterns are ‘wired in’ and remain fixed for a certain time, they can eventually be modified or even dismantled by the organism’s experience. Adults, for instance, no longer manifest some of the reflexes that helped them to find the mother’s nipple when they were infants.Argumentation2
In this context, I can merely point out that the three-part model of the action scheme remains a powerful analytical tool in the domain of reflection, but there, obviously, the perceptual situation is replaced by a conceptual one, and the activity by a mental operation; and perturbations are no longer caused by unexpected perceptual results but by relational surprises, such as the breach of an expected regularity or an operational result that is incompatible with other conceptual structures, The basic principle of the constructivist theory is that cognitive organisms act and operate in order to create and maintain their equilibrium in the face of perturbations generated by conflicts or unexpected novelties arising either from their pursuit of goals in a constraining environment or from the incompatibility of conceptual structures with a more or less established organisation of experience. The urge to know thus becomes the urge to fit, on the sensorimotor level as well as in the conceptual domain, and learning and adaptation are seen as complementary phenomena.
In this context, I can merely point out that the three-part model of the action scheme remains a powerful analytical tool in the domain of reflection, but there, obviously, the perceptual situation is replaced by a conceptual one, and the activity by a mental operation; and perturbations are no longer caused by unexpected perceptual results but by relational surprises, such as the breach of an expected regularity or an operational result that is incompatible with other conceptual structures, The basic principle of the constructivist theory is that cognitive organisms act and operate in order to create and maintain their equilibrium in the face of perturbations generated by conflicts or unexpected novelties arising either from their pursuit of goals in a constraining environment or from the incompatibility of conceptual structures with a more or less established organisation of experience. The urge to know thus becomes the urge to fit, on the sensorimotor level as well as in the conceptual domain, and learning and adaptation are seen as complementary phenomena.
Innovationsdiskurs2
During the last two decades of his life, when Piaget had realized that his theory had much in common with the principles formulated by cybernetics,[3] he shifted his focus from the chronology of development in children to the more general question of the cognitive organism’s generation and maintenance of equilibrium. In this regard, too, room was left for misunderstandings, because the term was not intended to have the same meaning on all levels of cognition. On the biological/physical level, an organism’s equilibrium can be said to consist in its capability to resist and neutralize perturbations caused by the environment. On the conceptual level, however, the term refers to the compatibility and non-contradictoriness of conceptual structures.
During the last two decades of his life, when Piaget had realized that his theory had much in common with the principles formulated by cybernetics,[3] he shifted his focus from the chronology of development in children to the more general question of the cognitive organism’s generation and maintenance of equilibrium. In this regard, too, room was left for misunderstandings, because the term was not intended to have the same meaning on all levels of cognition. On the biological/physical level, an organism’s equilibrium can be said to consist in its capability to resist and neutralize perturbations caused by the environment. On the conceptual level, however, the term refers to the compatibility and non-contradictoriness of conceptual structures.
Innovationsdiskurs2
If one accepts this principle, one can no longer maintain the traditional idea of knowledge as representing an ‘external’ reality supposed to be independent of the knower. The concept of knowledge has to be dismantled and reconstructed differently.
If one accepts this principle, one can no longer maintain the traditional idea of knowledge as representing an ‘external’ reality supposed to be independent of the knower. The concept of knowledge has to be dismantled and reconstructed differently.
Innovationsdiskurs2
This is a shocking suggestion, and I have elsewhere laid out the reasons for such a radical step (Glasersfeld, 1985). I have called my position radical constructivism to accentuate the changed concept of knowledge and to differentiate myself from those who speak of the construction of knowledge in the framework of a traditional epistemology.
This is a shocking suggestion, and I have elsewhere laid out the reasons for such a radical step (Glasersfeld, 1985). I have called my position radical constructivism to accentuate the changed concept of knowledge and to differentiate myself from those who speak of the construction of knowledge in the framework of a traditional epistemology.
WissenschaftlicheReferenz2
Piaget thus adopted the three-part sequence of the infant’s reflex as the basic structure of goal-directed sensorimotor activity. He called it action scheme (schème[4]) and built on it, with the help of his concepts of assimilation and accommodation, a revolutionary learning theory.
Piaget thus adopted the three-part sequence of the infant’s reflex as the basic structure of goal-directed sensorimotor activity. He called it action scheme (schème[4]) and built on it, with the help of his concepts of assimilation and accommodation, a revolutionary learning theory.
The student of Piaget’s writings, however, will not find this theory neatly formulated and described in any one place. Its development, presumably, took time and was spread in bits and pieces over a number of different publications (e.g. Piaget, 1937, 1945, 1967). As Bärbel Inhelder, Piaget’s constant and most important collaborator, remarked, “the notion of scheme has given and is still giving rise to different interpretations” (Inhelder & de Caprona, 1992,
p.41). The interpretation I am presenting here has proven the most useful in our applications.WissenschaftlicheReferenz2
I want to emphasize that I have so far spoken only of the sensorimotor level. A constructivist exposition of learning on the conceptual level would have to begin with Piaget’s theory of reflective abstraction (Piaget, 1977a, vols.1 & 2) which I have discussed elsewhere (cf. Glasersfeld, 1991b).
I want to emphasize that I have so far spoken only of the sensorimotor level. A constructivist exposition of learning on the conceptual level would have to begin with Piaget’s theory of reflective abstraction (Piaget, 1977a, vols.1 & 2) which I have discussed elsewhere (cf. Glasersfeld, 1991b).
WissenschaftlicheReferenz2
In the past ten years the beginnings of a constructivist approach to teaching have been developed and applied in practice (Clement, 1991; Cobb et al., 1992; Confrey, 1990; Désautels & Larochelle, 1989; Dykstra, D.I., 1991; Glasersfeld, Ed., 1991a; Steffe, 1991). Some of these applications are now yielding longitudinal studies with elementary school classes followed over two or three years. The preliminary results are extremely promising in that they show children who are learning to learn (cf. Cobb et al., 1992)
In the past ten years the beginnings of a constructivist approach to teaching have been developed and applied in practice (Clement, 1991; Cobb et al., 1992; Confrey, 1990; Désautels & Larochelle, 1989; Dykstra, D.I., 1991; Glasersfeld, Ed., 1991a; Steffe, 1991). Some of these applications are now yielding longitudinal studies with elementary school classes followed over two or three years. The preliminary results are extremely promising in that they show children who are learning to learn (cf. Cobb et al., 1992)
