Annotation:Text:Piaget’s Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity/Ah5txubmdq
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Revision as of 19:08, 24 July 2019 by Sarah Oberbichler (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{WissenschaftlicheReferenz2 |field_radiobutton=Begriffe }} {{TextAnnotation |AnnotationOf=Text:Piaget’s_Legacy:_Cognition_as_Adaptive_Activity |LastModificationDate=2019-07...")
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| Annotation of | Text:Piaget’s_Legacy:_Cognition_as_Adaptive_Activity |
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| Last Modification Date | 2019-07-24T20:08:07.598Z |
| Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
| Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ah5txubmdq","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":705°Ӻ,"quote":"But all these are not the kind of representation that concerns us here. The British philosopher John Locke used the term to indicate that words stand for (or “represent”) ideas (Locke, 1690, Bk. iii, Chpt. ii, §2); occasionally he used it also for the mental image of an idea, either fictitious (e.g. “the unspeakable joys of heaven”, Bk. ii, Chpt. xxi, §37) or “made up of ever so many particulars” (Bk. ii, Chpt. xxvi, §1). It was presumably this second meaning that led translators of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to use “representation” for the German word “Vorstellung”. This was unfortunate because the ordinary-language meaning had practically superseded the Locke’s more abstract second meaning.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32101318987756883082":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1563991687007°
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