Annotation:Text:Piaget’s Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity/Yiracgg7fu

Annotation of	Text:Piaget’s_Legacy:_Cognition_as_Adaptive_Activity
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date	2019-07-26T11:55:41.222Z
Last Modification User	User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata	^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Yiracgg7fu","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ21Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ/supӶ1Ӻ/aӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":3°Ӻ,"quote":"About a hundred and fifty years ago, Johannes Müller observed that all the neural impulses or signals that the so-called sense organs send to the cortex of the brain are qualitatively the same. As Heinz von Foerster, who three decades stressed the epistemological importance of this fact, puts it: these neural signals vary in frequency and intensity and tell us “how much”, but they never tell us “what” (Foerster, 1973). In other words, they are quantitative. They contain no information whatever about the character of the event that is supposed to have caused them. \nAccording to the neurophysiologist’s model of the nervous system, it therefore appears that the discrimination of sensory modalities—seeing, hearing, touching, etc.—must be the result of the system’s own computation. From this perspective, then, whatever sensory structures, patterns, or images a living system compiles are its own construction, and the notion that they represent something that was there beforehand, has no empirical foundation.Ӷ2Ӻ","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1564134931382°

Thema	Realität