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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ntkz63o9qc","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":1892,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":4626°Ӻ,"quote":"At a certain stage, then, in the organization of the experiential field, certain items that have been isolated in the ordinary way (i.e. in the way in which the other furniture of the experiential world has been constructed) manifest insubordination and effectively refute whatever categorization is tentatively assigned to them. This may occur for the first time when the child who has managed to catch a bright beetle, puts it with a collection of marbles and discovers a moment later that the marbles are still where they were but the beetle is busily crawling away. The child may then abstract the “ability to move by itself” and attribute it as an inherent property to certain items which can be managed successfully only if some such property is expected of them. In other words, the child will have to construct a rather more sophisticated model for beetles than for marbles. \nAs the organization of the experiential field continues and expands, perceptual capabilities, emotional reactions, intentions, and, eventually, the very faculty of experiencing in the same sense in which the subject himself or herself experiences, are attributed to a select category of experiential items. These items, finally, are seen as Others who not only experience as one does oneself, but also organize their experiential field and try, for better or for worse, to predict and to manage their own experiential futures. From this perspective, the corroboration of one’s own experience by an Other takes on a somewhat different but no less important significance. Since the Other is as much the subject’s own construction as everything else in the experiential field, the fact that an Other confirms some item one has oneself experienced, does not confer an independent “existence” on that item, but it does show that the particular construct one has used is viable, not only in the structure and organization of one’s own experience, but also as an interpretation of the Other’s way of constructing his or her experience. There arises, thus, a second level of assessing the viability of constructs: their viability in one’s interpretation of Others’ construction of reality. This second-order viability supplements the viability of regularities and rules one has coordinated in one’s “environment.” The radical constructivist, therefore, must not be thought to do away with “objectivity”—he merely defines it in a different way. Any concept, event, theory, or model will be considered “objective” if and only if it has proved to be viable not only in one’s own organization of the experiential world, but also in the particular area of conceptual organization that proves to be a viable model for the experiential worlds one imputes to others.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321078215333829526132":^°°,^"jQuery321078215333829526132":^°°,^"jQuery321078215333829526132":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1568978233290°
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