Annotation:Text:Distinguishing the Observer: An Attempt at Interpreting Maturana/Vwp5rwypgo

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Annotation of Text:Distinguishing_the_Observer:_An_Attempt_at_Interpreting_Maturana
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2019-09-27T14:10:15.758Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vwp5rwypgo","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":153,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":1928°Ӻ,"quote":"My own path (somewhat abbreviated and idealized) led from the early doubts of the Pre- Socratics via Montaigne, Berkeley, Vico, and Kant to pragmatism and eventually to Ceccato’s “Operational School” and Piaget’s “Genetic Epistemology”. This might seem irrelevant here, but since Maturana’s expositions hardly ever refer to traditional philosophy, it seems appropriate to mention that quite a few of his fundamental assertions can be substantiated by trains of thought which, from time to time, have cropped up in the conventional history of epistemology. Although these trains of thought have occasionally irritated the official discipline of philosophy, they never had a lasting effect and remained marginal curiosities. I would suggest, that the reason for this neglect is that throughout the occidental history of ideas and right down to our own days, two requisites have been considered fundamental in any epistemological venture. The first of these requisites demands that whatever we would like to call “true knowledge” has to be independent of the knowing subject. The second requisite is that knowledge is to be taken seriously only if it claims to represent a world of “thingsin- themselves” in a more or less veridical fashion. Although the sceptics of all ages explained with the help of logical arguments that both these requisites are unattainable, they limited themselves to observing that absolute knowledge was impossible. Only a few of them went a step further and tried to liberate the concept of knowledge from the impossible constraints so that it might be freely applied to what is attainable within the acting subject’s experiential world. Those who took that step were branded outsiders and could therefore be disregarded by professional philosophers.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210133245403116930342":^°°,^"jQuery3210133245403116930342":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Innovationsdiskurs2","data_creacio":1569586215222°
Innovationstyp Kritik an der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie