Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Tr1t9zxgay
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Revision as of 12:18, 11 December 2019 by Sarah Oberbichler (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{Prämisse3}} {{TextAnnotation |AnnotationOf=Annotationen:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation |LastModificationDate=2019-12-11T12:18:53.078Z |LastModificationUser=User:Sa...")
Annotation of | Annotationen:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation |
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Last Modification Date | 2019-12-11T12:18:53.078Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tr1t9zxgay","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1424°Ӻ,"quote":"Sometimes a historical note is added. It explains that the misguided notion goes back to Aristotle, remained current throughout the Middle Ages, and was discarded once and for all by the first modern scientists in the Renaissance. For science, as it developed in the Western world, it is unacceptable that something that lies in the future – something that has not yet occurred – should have the power to determine what is happening now. It would imply belief in an agency outside the field of our actual experience, and although such alien agencies were common-place in mythology and religion, the enterprise that came to be called science tries to manage without them. \nThis is not at all unreasonable. Contemporary scientists (at least the more thoughtful among them) no longer believe that their efforts will be able to clear up all mysteries presented by the world in which we find ourselves living. All the more, however, they believe that the tools they use, the concepts, hypotheses, and principles they formulate, must in some way be testable in the experiential world. These conceptual tools may originate as free inventions, but if they cannot be fitted into a more or less coherent network of demonstrable causes and effects they will not be considered scientific. “The scientist does not believe in effects without causes; not even when they happen in the brain” (Ashby, in Conant, 1981; p.425).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321072799625272896012":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1576063132765°
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