Annotation:Text:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Jc5rh2fgi3

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Annotation of Text:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2019-12-11T14:52:33.743Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jc5rh2fgi3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","endOffset":1999°Ӻ,"quote":"The causal agent held responsible for the change in “X” is located at tn, a distant point in the future. Consequently, something that has not yet entered the experiential world is assumed to have the power to determine an experience that is present. One might suggest that this would create no difficulty, if the notion of time that we abstract from the succession of our experiences had nothing to do with the sequence of events in a universe whose goings-on are independent of any experiencer. This assumption is not at all alien to ‘instrumentalists’ and ‘constructivists’ who hold that whatever we want to call knowledge inevitably applies only to the experiential world and warrants no inferences about an independent ontological reality. But even for this school of thought the oddity of this type of causation remains. To connect two experiential items by a concept of cause and effect, one must at least be able to re-present both to oneself. The prisoner who plots to escape presumably has some vision of an outside, a vision of what it would be like to be rid of the constraints that obstruct his freedom at present. Any such vision is a re-presentationӶ9Ӻ   of things he knows or dreams of, and it is this re-presentation that constitutes final cause, the end ‘for the sake of which’ he is now engaging in actions which, on the basis of past experience, he believes will bring that end about. In contrast, the ultimate good that Aristotle posits as the final cause in his metaphysics is not, and cannot be, the re-presentation of something already experienced. It will manifest itself only when it is reached. Consequently there is no past experience of steps that led towards it or actions that brought it about. There are no abstracted cause-effect relations that one could try to implement to reach an unfathomable end. In short, even for those who believe that knowledge does not pertain to anything beyond the realm of experience, a cause that lies outside has no explanatory power.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32109494004771408062":^°°,^"jQuery32109494004771408062":^°°,^"jQuery32109494004771408062":^°°,^"jQuery32109494004771408062":^°°,^"jQuery32109494004771408062":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1576072353227°
Thema Erfahrung
Thema Realität
Thema Vorstellung