Annotationen:Hans G. Furth – Not Radical enough: A critique of von Glasersfeld’s Radical Epistemology
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((5)) I am surprised that von Glasersfeld, as so many others, associates Piaget’s “assimilation” with stability (33) and “accommodation” with newness (35)&(37). This is almost the opposite of what Piaget means with these concepts! Similarly, I find it insufficient that he quotes Piaget’s equilibration concept without adding Piaget's adjective “majorante.” However you translate this word (“enlarging,” “growing”), it dramatically changes the meaning into almost the opposite of a mechanical balance. No wonder, it is not a helpful concept. ((6)) The Suggestion that in humans “equilibration” rather than “survival” has become the criterion of adaptation (27) shows again von Glasersfeld’s narrow focus on cognition and the uncritical assumption of a pre-given reality that we “perceive" and “observe” (31)&(32).
((5)) I am surprised that von Glasersfeld, as so many others, associates Piaget’s “assimilation” with stability (33) and “accommodation” with newness (35)&(37). This is almost the opposite of what Piaget means with these concepts! Similarly, I find it insufficient that he quotes Piaget’s equilibration concept without adding Piaget's adjective “majorante.” However you translate this word (“enlarging,” “growing”), it dramatically changes the meaning into almost the opposite of a mechanical balance. No wonder, it is not a helpful concept. ((6)) The Suggestion that in humans “equilibration” rather than “survival” has become the criterion of adaptation (27) shows again von Glasersfeld’s narrow focus on cognition and the uncritical assumption of a pre-given reality that we “perceive" and “observe” (31)&(32).
ArgumentationFremd
((7)) E. von Glasersfeld’s notions of “protospace” (47) and “prototime” (48) seem to me intriguing allusions to Piaget's sensorimotor schemes, even as the distinction between recognition and recall (50) parallels Piaget’s differentiation between sensorimotor and mental object know-how. I agree with von Glasersfeld (51) that the clearest instance of the construction of a mental object is the formation of an internal image or a symbol.
((7)) E. von Glasersfeld’s notions of “protospace” (47) and “prototime” (48) seem to me intriguing allusions to Piaget's sensorimotor schemes, even as the distinction between recognition and recall (50) parallels Piaget’s differentiation between sensorimotor and mental object know-how. I agree with von Glasersfeld (51) that the clearest instance of the construction of a mental object is the formation of an internal image or a symbol.
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((8)) Nevertheless, by never clearly referring to sensorimotor or action know-how as preceding mental object know-how, von Glasersfeld fails to highlight what I would consider the most conspicuous and most constructivist component of Piaget’s theory of knowledge. Namely that action, not perception, is the key concept of an adequate theory of knowledge and that we humans in development first construct the reality of sensorimotor action knowledge before we continue to construct the reality of mental object knowledge
((8)) Nevertheless, by never clearly referring to sensorimotor or action know-how as preceding mental object know-how, von Glasersfeld fails to highlight what I would consider the most conspicuous and most constructivist component of Piaget’s theory of knowledge. Namely that action, not perception, is the key concept of an adequate theory of knowledge and that we humans in development first construct the reality of sensorimotor action knowledge before we continue to construct the reality of mental object knowledge
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((16)) Moreover, I agree with von Glasersfeld (62) that short of a transcendent basis, a radical constructivism is a potent ground for rejecting a crude ethical relativism “where anything goes.” By seeing us as constructors of our reality/society, I at the same time stress my responsibility for a world that we now threaten with extinction and I acknowledge the quasi biological social constraints (such as sharing of symbols or mutual relations) that are already evident in spontaneous child development. ((17)) In conclusion, von Glasersfeld’s “radical” theory of knowledge certainly points in the right direction, but seems to me to lack the full radicalness that I detect, explicitly or implicitly, in Piaget’s work.
((16)) Moreover, I agree with von Glasersfeld (62) that short of a transcendent basis, a radical constructivism is a potent ground for rejecting a crude ethical relativism “where anything goes.” By seeing us as constructors of our reality/society, I at the same time stress my responsibility for a world that we now threaten with extinction and I acknowledge the quasi biological social constraints (such as sharing of symbols or mutual relations) that are already evident in spontaneous child development. ((17)) In conclusion, von Glasersfeld’s “radical” theory of knowledge certainly points in the right direction, but seems to me to lack the full radicalness that I detect, explicitly or implicitly, in Piaget’s work.
