Annotation:Text:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Bekuhbyvp5

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Referenztyp: Theorie
Annotation of Text:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2020-01-17T19:42:19.234Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bekuhbyvp5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ31Ӻ","startOffset":2465,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/preӶ18Ӻ","endOffset":465°Ӻ,"quote":"To end this cursory review of the teleology debate in biology, I want to return to a passage in Aristotle which would deserve to be mentioned in the context of evolution. In chapter 8 of Book II on Physics, Aristotle sets up a straw man in order to argue for his belief that the world as a whole has a purpose and is teleologically guided. The straw man is a remarkable anticipation of the theory of evolution in terms of natural selection. From our present point of view, the argument he brings up against this theory is unconvincing because it is metaphysical, not scientific. This is not surprising. What is surprising, is that in this passage Darwin and Wallace could have found all the essential components of their theory: spontaneous, accidental variation, fit with the environment, and the elimination of the unfit by natural selection. – Aristotle’s closing argument, though conceived more than two thousand years ago, crystallized a theme that still reverberates in natural philosophy today: \n\nIt is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature. If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in nature. The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that.  It is plain that nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose.(Physics, Book II, ch.8, 199b)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32108604521753538622":^°°,^"jQuery32108604521753538622":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1579286538905°