Annotation:Text:The Control of Perception and the Construction of Reality: Epistemological Aspects of the Feedback-Control System/L3cavwtzsb
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Annotation of | Text:The_Control_of_Perception_and_the_Construction_of_Reality:_Epistemological_Aspects_of_the_Feedback-Control_System |
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Last Modification Date | 2020-06-16T12:40:44.940Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"L3cavwtzsb","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ50Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ50Ӻ","endOffset":1672°Ӻ,"quote":"Once we adopt this position, we can put the ontological questions into their place – which is not to say that we answer them. In our role as observers/constructors of organisms it should not surprise us that “several people can perceive or act or be affected by the same object at one time” (Hirst 1964, p. 259). Since we have constructed “other people” by crediting certain permanent objects within our experience with goal-directed behavior and goal structures similar to those we attribute to ourselves, it would indeed be surprising if these “others” did not act and were not affected by objects in ways which in principle, we could attribute to ourselves. And since, in constructing the object, we have given it “permanence” by projecting it into an external world, it should not surprise us that we now expect it “to persist even when it is unobserved” (ibid.). We are constantly striving to achieve a homogeneous, consistent, non- contradictory construction of our experiential world. We are constantly looking for invariances and assimilating experiences by disregarding individual differences. Hence we should not be surprised when we perceive things to be similar, recurrent, and invariant . But, as we have tried to show, similarity, recurrence, and invariance pertain to the way in which we organize our experience, and nothing in our experience could warrant the assumption that they are characteristic of an ontological reality. That such a reality exists, that it contains permanent objects and other people may be our profound intuitive belief, but if we restrict “knowledge” to what we can rationally demonstrate, we have no way of knowing such a reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210169141624291851422":^°°,^"jQuery3210169141624291851422":^°°,^"jQuery3210169141624291851422":^°°,^"jQuery3210169141624291851422":^°°,^"jQuery3210169141624291851422":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1592304031610°
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