Annotation:Text:Problems of Knowledge and Cognizing Organisms/Vifz5g6gq3

From DigiVis
< Annotation:Text:Problems of Knowledge and Cognizing Organisms
Revision as of 15:05, 16 July 2020 by Sarah Oberbichler (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{Innovationsdiskurs2}} {{TextAnnotation |AnnotationOf=Text:Problems_of_Knowledge_and_Cognizing_Organisms |LastModificationDate=2020-07-16T16:05:27.261Z |LastModificationUser=...")
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to: navigation, search
Annotation of Text:Problems_of_Knowledge_and_Cognizing_Organisms
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2020-07-16T16:05:27.261Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vifz5g6gq3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":900°Ӻ,"quote":"A comparison between the history of science and that of epistemology brings out yet another point: Scientists, at least since Kepler and Galileo, have never hesitated to redefine or even radically change the concepts with which they were operating, whenever such a change permitted them to construct a more compre- hensive or more homogeneous theory. Not so the epistemologists. They are today juggling with the very same concepts and formulations with which Socrates approached the problem of knowledge. Indeed, it is almost as though there were a rule that anyone embarking upon an investigation of knowledge must start where Socrates started -in spite of the fact that all the paths that epistemologists have since then trodden from that starting point have led them into blind alleys or into philosophical systems which have remained altogether alien to the empirical pursuits of Western Science.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210354372536760819032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Innovationsdiskurs2","data_creacio":1594908326930°
Innovationstyp Kritik an der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie