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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Kpyjuyru8a","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ18Ӻ","endOffset":972°Ӻ,"quote":"In the struggle to organize and systematize our experience, of course, it has seemed quite natural to assign to the active experiencer a location within the part of our experience that we categorize as our body, and, then, in turn, to assign to that body a location within that other part of our experience which we categorize as our own environment. These categorizations seem natural because we make them in analogy to those that proved so successful in isolating and individuating things and organisms in our field of experience (where we have access to things which are outside these organisms). Though the analogy is logically quite illegitimate, because it confounds the experiencer with what he experiences as himself, the world view to which it inevitably leads has proven almost irresistible. It is the view that ascribes to a ready-made world the responsibility and “causes” of our perceptual experience. As Socrates put it, “when I perceive I must become percipient of something.”\nThe Western world has accepted this scenario almost unquestioningly. Nearly all thinkers who have pondered problems of epistemology have explicitly or implicitly adopted the view that the activity of “knowing” begins with a cut between the cognizing subject and the object to be knownӶ6Ӻ. That is, they assume an existing world, an ontological reality, and once this assumption has been made, it follows necessarily that the knower will have this world as his environment and it will be his task to get to know it as best he can. Knowing, thus, becomes an act of duplicating or replicating what is supposed to be already there, outside the knower. The senses become the indispensable mediators that convey “information” in the basis of which the knower can represent to himself a replica of what “exists” – but, literally, only a God could know whether man’s replica is a replica or a fiction.\nYet, if what we have said so far has any consistency at all, it should now be clear that the first cut, the most elementary distinction (Brown, 1969) an experiencer can make, may be the intuitively satisfactory cut between himself qua experiencing subject on the one side, and his experience on the other. But this cut can under no circumstances be a cut between himself and an independently existing world of objective objects. Our “knowledge,” whatever rational meaning give to that term, must begin with experience -such as, for instance, the cut we make between the part of our experience that we come to call “ourself” and all the rest of our experience, which we then call our “world.” Hence, this world of ours, no matter how we structure it, no matter how well we manage to keep it stable with permanent objects and recurrent interactions, is by definition the “subjective” world of our experience and not the ontological reality of which philosopher have dreamed.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210354372536760819032":^°°,^"jQuery3210354372536760819032":^°°,^"jQuery3210354372536760819032":^°°,^"jQuery3210354372536760819032":^°°,^"jQuery3210354372536760819032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1594913955535°
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