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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nn9w0basmp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ19Ӻ","endOffset":249°Ӻ,"quote":"The main argument of the sceptics is simple and irrefutable. To know whether anything we derive from experience corresponds to, or “represents” an aspect of an external world, we should have to be able to compare it to the real thing. But this we cannot do, because we can compare experiences only to more experiences. \nSome early theologians of the Christian era added another solid argument: Reason, they said, operates with concepts that we have derived from experience; in our experiential field we never meet anything that is omniscient, omnipotent, and ever-present; consequently, we cannot rationally conceive of God, because the knowledge, the power, and the eternity we should ascribe to Him go beyond what is conceivable to us (cf. Meyendorff, 1974).\nUnlike the church that persecuted them, they did not see this as a calamity, because they understood that faith does not require a rational grounding.\nThe argument that our concepts, which we abstract from experience, cannot grasp anything that lies beyond our experiential interface, applies not only to the divine but also to any ontological reality posited as independent of the human experiencer.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1564134754880°
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