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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bq42oszf1j","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/preӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/preӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":200°Ӻ,"quote":"That for the sake of which a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. (‘Why is he walking about?’ we say. ‘To be healthy’, and having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g. … drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. All these things are ‘for the sake of’ the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments. (Aristotle, Physics, Book II, ch.3, 194b-195a) \n\nIn the next paragraph, where Aristotle adds some further remarks on his classification of causes, he says: \n\nSome things cause each other reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the origin of change. (Physics, Book II, ch.3, 195a)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32109494004771408062":^°°,^"jQuery32109494004771408062":^°°,^"jQuery32109494004771408062":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1576072001137°
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