| Annotation Metadata
|
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Od0rxsgqaf","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ28Ӻ","startOffset":1597,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ28Ӻ","endOffset":3227°Ӻ,"quote":"But this means that there must be something in the organism that decides whether an action does or does not ‘work’. This assessment may be as automatic and unconscious as it is with the rat that avoids electric shock or the toddler who stays away from the hot stove; but, conscious or not, there is something that decides that actions which lead to shocks or burning sensations do not ‘work’ and, consequently, should not be repeated. \nTo my mind, this way of analysing behavior is illuminating because it brings out the governing principle of induction. But it is incomplete because it persistently avoids mentioning that in order to answer the question what works, one needs a notion of value, no matter how elementary or unconscious that notion might be. If there is no preference for not having pain and getting blisters on one’s fingers, there is no reason why the toddler should not touch the hot stove every time it happens to be near enough. \nThis point is crucial to any discussion of our concepts of causality. If we claim that the causal connections we inductively make between segments of experience are ‘shaped and maintained’ because they work, we must go on to explain that ‘work’, in this context means that these connections enable us, at least to some extent, to avoid certain situations and to engender others that we prefer. In other words, the causal connections, fragile though they may be, provide some control over our experience. From this, one is led to conclude that the scientific search of efficient causes is fueled largely, if not entirely, by our intention to use them for the attainment of goals.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32108604521753538622":^°°,^"jQuery32108604521753538622":^°°,^"jQuery32108604521753538622":^°°,^"jQuery32108604521753538622":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1579284213517°
|
