]> 2026-06-24T22:02:17+02:00 Annotation:Text:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/J59xlkff23 248 en ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"J59xlkff23","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ37Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ37Ӻ","endOffset":1166°Ӻ,"quote":"This leads to the second use I want to suggest for the black box concept. If it is the experiencer’s intelligence or cognitive activity that, by organizing itself, organizes experience into a viable representation of a world, then one can consider that representation a model, and the “outside reality” it claims to represent, a black box. The moment we attribute to the learning homeostat (to use our original example) the capabilities of representation and hypothesis, it can begin to conjecture how it comes about that a certain activity regularly results in the modification of a certain sensory signal. It can begin to construct a representation of an external world with which it has two conceivable points of contact: “input” in the form of its effect on the outside, and “output” in the form of outside events that cause its own sensory signals. The rep- resentation, therefore, will have to be no more and no less than a hypothetical model of functions, entities, and events that could “explain” regularities in the organism’s experience. And as a cyberneticist would expect, there is no way to match the model against the “real” structure of the black box.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321030334267355695812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1561230440583° 2019-07-24T14:21:48Z 2458689.0984722 2019-07-24T12:21:50Z 2458689.015162 Text:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/J59xlkff23