]> 2026-06-27T02:34:32+02:00 Annotation:Text:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Rk7rvgg4e3 248 en ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rk7rvgg4e3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ65Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ66Ӻ","endOffset":627°Ӻ,"quote":"“The object is in the first instance only known through the subject’s actions, and therefore must be itself constructed” (Piaget, 1972, p.82). For Piaget, early instances of “objects” are always subsections of an action scheme. They are the sensory schemes which, in conjunction with a motor scheme, constitute a sensorimotor activity. As such they are always a compound of perceptual as well as proprioceptive data. That is to say, they are a scheme composed not only of several sensory signals but also of signals in several sensory modes. Usually this means that they contain visual and tactual signals as well as proprioceptive signals deriving from the motor activity of the perceiver.\nAs the result of many acts of accommodation that added or removed particular experiential elements, an object-scheme becomes relatively invariant and may be used to assimilate new experience. But all this still takes place on the level of sensorimotor activities and, though it may serve as partial model for later developments, it does not entail the formation of concepts. Hence this use of an invariant scheme is by no means a manifestation of the concept of object permanence, because its invariance arises from and consists in the repetition of an activity and does not yet involve the invariance of an independent object.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321030334267355695812":^°°,^"jQuery321030334267355695812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1561394374333° 2019-07-24T14:28:37Z 2458689.103206 2019-07-24T12:28:38Z 2458689.0198843 Text:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Rk7rvgg4e3