]> 2026-04-19T17:01:53+02:00 Annotation:Text:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Udchli0dhe 248 en ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Udchli0dhe","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ106Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ106Ӻ","endOffset":1316°Ӻ,"quote":"When I visually distinguish a hand from the writing pad and the table on which it lies, I carry out exactly the same kinds of operations as when I distinguish the coffee cup from the table on which it stands, or the picture from the wall on which it hangs, or the cardinal outside my window from the branch on which it happens to be perched and from the rest of the landscape. In all these cases I am recognizing certain objects to which I have attributed relative consistency (closure) and permanence. Having successfully externalized permanent objects, I am now experiencing them as parts of “distal reality.” From the purely visual point of view, the operations by means of which I separate objects from the rest of the visual field or “ground” are always the same kind. And the observer’s distinction between an organism and its environment is normally made in the visual field (which is not to say that such a distinction could not be made in the tactual mode). Thus, although we can visually distinguish birds, coffee cups, tables, and hands from the rest of the visual field and from one another, it seems clear that a naive organism (i.e., an organism such as an infant that does not yet have a great deal of intermodally coordinated experiences) cannot visually discriminate between a hand and his own hand.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321030334267355695812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1561555386225° 2019-07-24T14:29:37Z 2458689.1039005 2019-07-24T12:29:39Z 2458689.0205903 Text:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Udchli0dhe