Editing Annotation:Text:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Ymhc2gd2us

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|AnnotationOf=Text:Abstraction,_Re-Presentation,_and_Reflection:_An_Interpretation_of_Experience_and_of_Piaget’s_Approach

|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler

|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler

|AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ymhc2gd2us","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ27Ӻ","endOffset":138°Ӻ,"quote":"The fact that conscious conceptualized knowledge of a given situation developmentally lags behind the knowledge of how to act in the situation, is commonplace on the sensorymotor level. In my view, as I mentioned earlier, this is analogous to the temporal lag of the ability to re-present a given item relative to the ability to recognize it. But the ability spontaneously to re-present to oneself a sensory- motor image of, say, an apple, still falls short of what Piaget in the above passage called “conceptualized understanding”. This would involve awareness of the characteristics inherent in the concept of apple or whatever one is re-presenting to oneself, and this kind of awareness constitutes a higher level of mental functioning. This further step requires a good deal more of what Locke called the mind’s “art and pains to set (something) at a distance and make it its own object.” A familiar motor pattern is once more a good example: we may be well able to re-present to ourselves a tennis stroke or a golf swing, but few, if any, would claim to have a “conceptualized understanding” of the sequence of elementary motor acts that are involved in such an abstraction of a delicately coordinated activity. Yet it is clear that, insofar as such understanding is possible, it can be built up only as a “retroactive thematization”, that is, after the whole pattern has been empirically abstracted from the experience of enacting it.\nIn Piaget’s theory, the situation is similar in the first type of reflective abstraction: he maintains that it, too, may or may not involve the subject’s awareness.\n\nThroughout history, thinkers have used thought structures without having grasped them consciously. A classic example: Aristotle used the logic of relations, yet ignored it entirely in the construction of his own logic. (Piaget & Garcia, 1983; p.37)\nIn other words, one can be quite aware of what one is cognitively operating on, without being aware of the operations one is carrying out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560436436052°

|AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ymhc2gd2us","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ27Ӻ","endOffset":138°Ӻ,"quote":"The fact that conscious conceptualized knowledge of a given situation developmentally lags behind the knowledge of how to act in the situation, is commonplace on the sensorymotor level. In my view, as I mentioned earlier, this is analogous to the temporal lag of the ability to re-present a given item relative to the ability to recognize it. But the ability spontaneously to re-present to oneself a sensory- motor image of, say, an apple, still falls short of what Piaget in the above passage called “conceptualized understanding”. This would involve awareness of the characteristics inherent in the concept of apple or whatever one is re-presenting to oneself, and this kind of awareness constitutes a higher level of mental functioning. This further step requires a good deal more of what Locke called the mind’s “art and pains to set (something) at a distance and make it its own object.” A familiar motor pattern is once more a good example: we may be well able to re-present to ourselves a tennis stroke or a golf swing, but few, if any, would claim to have a “conceptualized understanding” of the sequence of elementary motor acts that are involved in such an abstraction of a delicately coordinated activity. Yet it is clear that, insofar as such understanding is possible, it can be built up only as a “retroactive thematization”, that is, after the whole pattern has been empirically abstracted from the experience of enacting it.\nIn Piaget’s theory, the situation is similar in the first type of reflective abstraction: he maintains that it, too, may or may not involve the subject’s awareness.\n\nThroughout history, thinkers have used thought structures without having grasped them consciously. A classic example: Aristotle used the logic of relations, yet ignored it entirely in the construction of his own logic. (Piaget & Garcia, 1983; p.37)\nIn other words, one can be quite aware of what one is cognitively operating on, without being aware of the operations one is carrying out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°,^"jQuery321091043661998117012":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560436436052°

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