Editing Annotation:Text:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/M8n5jcm1l2
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|AnnotationOf=Text:Cybernetics,_Experience,_and_the_Concept_of_Self | |AnnotationOf=Text:Cybernetics,_Experience,_and_the_Concept_of_Self | ||
| − | |LastModificationDate=2019- | + | |AnnotationComment=Both the internal and the external, however, are explicitly experience, and the division between them, therefore, is a division between two types of experience and not the division between an experiencing subject and the objects it experiences. |
| + | |LastModificationDate=2019-06-26T14:51:16.967Z | ||
|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | |LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | ||
| − | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M8n5jcm1l2","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ102Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ102Ӻ","endOffset":1466°Ӻ,"quote":"Perhaps the most serious obstacle that has impeded traditional psychology from arriving at a plausible analysis of the concept of “self” is the assumption that the dichotomy between an organism and its environment is basically the same as the dichotomy between an experiencing subject and what it experiences. As argued in the section “Observer and Observed,” the distinction between an organism and its environment can be made only by an observer of the organism. The organism itself has no access to distal data, to items outside itself. But with the construction of permanent objects, the organism externalizes some of the invariants it abstracts from its experience and treats them, from then on, as independent external items (see “Equivalence and Continuity,” above). This externalization, as we have seen, goes hand in hand with the establishing of internal representations or concepts, and this dual development of objects, which are “perceptual,” and concepts, which are “representational,” leads to a sharp division between two forms of experience, one “external” and the other “internal.” (There are, of course, illusions, dreams, and hallucinations that, from the subject’s point of view, blur that division.) Both the internal and the external, however, are explicitly experience, and the division between them, therefore, is a division between two types of experience and not the division between an experiencing subject and the objects it experiences.","highlights":Ӷ^" | + | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M8n5jcm1l2","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ102Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ102Ӻ","endOffset":1466°Ӻ,"quote":"Perhaps the most serious obstacle that has impeded traditional psychology from arriving at a plausible analysis of the concept of “self” is the assumption that the dichotomy between an organism and its environment is basically the same as the dichotomy between an experiencing subject and what it experiences. As argued in the section “Observer and Observed,” the distinction between an organism and its environment can be made only by an observer of the organism. The organism itself has no access to distal data, to items outside itself. But with the construction of permanent objects, the organism externalizes some of the invariants it abstracts from its experience and treats them, from then on, as independent external items (see “Equivalence and Continuity,” above). This externalization, as we have seen, goes hand in hand with the establishing of internal representations or concepts, and this dual development of objects, which are “perceptual,” and concepts, which are “representational,” leads to a sharp division between two forms of experience, one “external” and the other “internal.” (There are, of course, illusions, dreams, and hallucinations that, from the subject’s point of view, blur that division.) Both the internal and the external, however, are explicitly experience, and the division between them, therefore, is a division between two types of experience and not the division between an experiencing subject and the objects it experiences.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321016099162942134662":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Both the internal and the external, however, are explicitly experience, and the division between them, therefore, is a division between two types of experience and not the division between an experiencing subject and the objects it experiences.","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1561553410048° |
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