Editing Annotation:Text:Knowing in Self-Regulating Organisms (A Constructivist Approach)/K6ongvthtj

|LastModificationDate=2019-07-01T11:22:07.193Z

|AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"K6ongvthtj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":959°Ӻ,"quote":"For epistemologists, then, it may be useful to look at how we come to have that kind of knowledge. From my point of view, Humberto Maturana has provided the most lucid analysis of the procedure that is usually called “the scientific method”.Ӷ1Ӻ Maturana divides the procedure into four steps: \n\nOBSERVATION. In order to count as “scientific”, an observation must be carried out under certain constraints, and the constraints must be made explicit (so that the observation can be repeated).\nObservations may then be related by an HYPOTHESIS, usually an inductive hypothesis that involves causal connections.\nBy deduction a PREDICTION is derived from the hypothesis, a prediction that concerns an event that has not yet been observed.\nThe scientist then sets out to observe the predicted event; again, the OBSERVATION must take place under certain explicit constraints.\nThroughout the four steps, what matters is experience. Observing is a way of experiencing and, to be scientific, it must be regulated by certain constraints. The hypotheses by means of which one then relates one’s observations, connect experiences, not “things-in-themselves”. The predictions, again, regard experiences, not events in some “real” world that lies beyond one’s actual experience.\nSeen in this way, the scientific method does not refer to, nor does it need, an ontological reality – it concerns exclusively the experiential world of observers.\nScientific knowledge, then, does not and could not yield a picture of the “real” world; it provides more or less reliable ways of dealing with experience. Hence it may be viable, but it can make no claim to “Truth”, if “Truth” is to be understood as a correspondence to the ontologically real world. On the other hand, this way of looking at knowledge, be it scientific or other, makes it immune against the sceptics’ perennial argument. Since this constructivist notion of knowledge does not claim to provide a picture of something beyond experience, the fact that one cannot compare it with such a something, does not detract from this kind of knowledge - it is either viable or it is not. Indeed, as a constructivist, I tend to go one step further: Since we have access only to experience and cannot get outside the experiential field, there is no way one could show that one’s experiences are the effects of causes that lie outside the experiential world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°,^"jQuery32106540072489306352":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Scientific knowledge, then, does not and could not yield a picture of the “real” world; it provides more or less reliable ways of dealing with experience. Hence it may be viable, but it can make no claim to “Truth”, if “Truth” is to be understood as a correspondence to the ontologically real world.    Since we have access only to experience and cannot get outside the experiential field, there is no way one could show that one’s experiences are the effects of causes that lie outside the experiential world.","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1561972852782°