Editing Annotation:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge/Nn6rkzzyi4
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|AnnotationOf=The_Concepts_of_Adaptation_and_Viability_in_a_Radical_Constructivist_Theory_of_Knowledge | |AnnotationOf=The_Concepts_of_Adaptation_and_Viability_in_a_Radical_Constructivist_Theory_of_Knowledge | ||
| − | |AnnotationComment=Die Beziehung zwischen unserem Wissen und | + | |AnnotationComment=Die Beziehung zwischen unserem Wissen und "Realität" ähnelt der Beziehung zwischen Organismus und Umwelt: Konstruierte Ideen, Hypothesen und Modelle überleben, solange unsere Erfahrung erfolgreich hineinpasst. |
| − | |LastModificationDate=2019-03-29T19: | + | |LastModificationDate=2019-03-29T19:08:40.705Z |
|LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | |LastModificationUser=User:Sarah Oberbichler | ||
| − | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nn6rkzzyi4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":1487°Ӻ,"quote":"What I suggest now, is that the relationship between our knowledge and “reality” is similar to the relationship between organisms and their environment.Ӷ4Ӻ In other words, we construct ideas, hypotheses, theories, and models, and as long they survive, which is to say, as long as our experience can be successfully fitted into them, they are viable. (In Piagetian terms we might say that our constructs are viable as long as our experience can be assimilated to them.)\nThis, of course, immediately raises the question as to what “survival” and “viability” mean in the cognitive domain. Briefly stated, concepts, theories, and cognitive structures in general, are viable and survive as long hey serve the purposes to which they are put, as long as they more or less reliably get us what we want. “Getting us what we want,” however, means different things in different realms of experience. In the realm of everyday experience, for instance, Newton’s physics serves our purposes well and is perfectly viable. Most of us simply do not enter the realms of experience where the methods and predictions based on Newton’s concepts break down. This is not so for the ideal scientist (e.g., as portrayed by Popper, 1934/1965 and 1962/1968) who is perennially searching for concepts and theories that “get by” the constraints encountered in all realms of experience and who is, therefore, more concerned with the possible “falsification” of his concepts and hypotheses than with their practical success as means in the pursuit of certain limited ends. This leads to the somewhat peculiar situation that Newton’s ideas are quite “true” for the man in the street, the mechanic, and the working engineer, whereas hey are “false” for a relatively small group of specialized scientists. What must be stressed, however, is that none of this can change the epistemological status of the ideas, concepts, theories, or models that we consider as constituting our “knowledge.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Beziehung zwischen unserem Wissen und | + | |AnnotationMetadata=^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nn6rkzzyi4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":1487°Ӻ,"quote":"What I suggest now, is that the relationship between our knowledge and “reality” is similar to the relationship between organisms and their environment.Ӷ4Ӻ In other words, we construct ideas, hypotheses, theories, and models, and as long they survive, which is to say, as long as our experience can be successfully fitted into them, they are viable. (In Piagetian terms we might say that our constructs are viable as long as our experience can be assimilated to them.)\nThis, of course, immediately raises the question as to what “survival” and “viability” mean in the cognitive domain. Briefly stated, concepts, theories, and cognitive structures in general, are viable and survive as long hey serve the purposes to which they are put, as long as they more or less reliably get us what we want. “Getting us what we want,” however, means different things in different realms of experience. In the realm of everyday experience, for instance, Newton’s physics serves our purposes well and is perfectly viable. Most of us simply do not enter the realms of experience where the methods and predictions based on Newton’s concepts break down. This is not so for the ideal scientist (e.g., as portrayed by Popper, 1934/1965 and 1962/1968) who is perennially searching for concepts and theories that “get by” the constraints encountered in all realms of experience and who is, therefore, more concerned with the possible “falsification” of his concepts and hypotheses than with their practical success as means in the pursuit of certain limited ends. This leads to the somewhat peculiar situation that Newton’s ideas are quite “true” for the man in the street, the mechanic, and the working engineer, whereas hey are “false” for a relatively small group of specialized scientists. What must be stressed, however, is that none of this can change the epistemological status of the ideas, concepts, theories, or models that we consider as constituting our “knowledge.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°,^"jQuery321050088968346891672":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Beziehung zwischen unserem Wissen und \"Realität\" ähnelt der Beziehung zwischen Organismus und Umwelt: Konstruierte Ideen, Hypothesen und Modelle überleben, solange unsere Erfahrung erfolgreich hineinpasst. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1553882918782° |
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