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There are, for instance, the conscious or unconscious accommodations we have to make – and make quite successfully – in the thousands of trivial routines that are indispensable in our way of living, such as retrieving the toothpaste that has fallen behind the wash basin, looking up the telephone number of a person we want to meet, locating a book on a shelf, finding our misplaced car keys, negotiating the stairs to the garage during a power failure, etc., etc.  +
A simple example may illustrate this. Having got tired of buying matches, someone may decide to design a cigarette lighter. Lighting cigarettes will be the purpose prescribed for the gadget. “People do not build purposeless machines” (loc.cit.).  +
As they quickly discovered, one and the same thing might be reinforcing under certain circumstances (e.g. meat pellets, when the rat was hungry) and not reinforcing under others (e.g. when the rat was well fed).  +
The analogy, of course, does not stretch to include the sculptor. The natural environment that carries out the selective process has no more a vision of the forms that are left than the sculptor’s chisel has a vision of the statue it helps to peel out of the marble. Such a vision may be attributed to the sculptor. It would constitute a telos or goal, which will be discussed when we come to final causes.  +
In order to remain among the survivors, an organism has to "get by" the constraints which the environment poses.  +
It is easy to see that a bricklayer is to some extent constrained in his building by certain basic characteristics that are inherent in the bricks he uses. In much the same way, I believe, the representation we construct of our adult experiential world is constrained by certain basic characteristics of the building blocks we are using, which is to say, the building blocks which we created during the sensorimotor period.  +
Any construction, be it physical or mental, is subject to certain constraints that spring from the material that the constructor employs.  +
A rather convincing case can be made for the notion that all practical learning may be considered the result of a process of induction.  +
It seems, then, that there is simply no way around the assumption that organisms construct their representations of their world, their environment, or whatever one chooses to call what is outside them. In other words, an activity of construction has to be assumed regardless of whether one wants to be a constructivist or not.  +
Thus we can say that the only indication we may get of the "real" structure of the environment is through the organisms and the species that have been extinguished; the viable ones that survive merely constitute a selection of solutions among an infinity of potential solutions that might be equally viable.  +
“Knowledge is construction.”  +
To me, therefore, time is not, as Prigogine said, an illusion. If I called the construct of time an illusion, the entire world that I know, the world that I live in, would also have to be called an illusion. And that is not the way I would characterize it. Although my entire world is a construction, I can still make a useful distinction in it between illusion and reality. But remember that for me “reality” always refers to experiential reality, not to the ontological reality of traditional philosophy. If we want to construct a rational reality for ourselves, time and space are indispensable building blocks, and I would rather call “illusion” any claim to knowledge beyond the field of our experience.  +
After a while you conclude that each group may be right for itself and that there is no rightness outside the groups.  +
In this changed perspective, then, knowledge does not provide a representation of an independent world but rather a map of what can be done in the experienced environment.  +
To be viable, a new thought should fit into the existing scheme of conceptual structures in a way that does not cause contradictions. If there are contradictions, either the new thought or the old structures are deemed to require changing.  +
Let us assume that I was here yesterday and, just as now, had a glass of water in front of me. I come in today and say: “Oh, this is the same glass, the identical glass that stood here yesterday.” If someone asked me, how I can tell that it is the identical glass, I should have to look for a particular that distinguishes this glass from all others. This may turn out to be impossible.  +
So we are trapped in a paradox. We want to believe that we can know something of the outside world, but we can never tell whether this knowledge is true.  +
It is therefore unwarranted to maintain that we distinguish things because we receive “information” from what we usually call the outside world.  +
There is no constructing unless you have some form of reflection.  +
Therefore there must be some place beyond my field of experience where the glass could be while I was busy experiencing other things or asleep.  +
Communication, therefore, works when two people send each other a telegram and they have previously established a code outside that communication system.  +
Let us assume that your attention is caught by the color red. As such the redness is not confined, has not yet a specific shape in your visual field, and is not a discrete thing. But as you focus on it, you are able to fit the color into the pattern you have learned to call “house”. If you were asked to describe what you see, you would most likely say: “there is a red house”. You choose the adjectival connection because the color and the thing were produced in a continuous application of attention. If, on the other hand, you recognize in your visual field a pattern that fits your concept of “house” and only then, scanning it more closely, you focus attention on its color, you would most likely say: “the house is red”. This syntactic structure clearly expresses that the concept of “house” was brought forth independently of the color that was subsequently attributed to it.  +
We all develop a repertoire of conceptual items and connections, and learn to fit them to the syntactic structures that have become customary among the users of a given language.  +
As Tomasello and a few before him noticed, Children do not produce their utterances with the help of grammatical rules. Even adults rarely rely on abstract syntactic rules to guide their speech. They know how they have segmented their experience and the praxis of living has shown them useful ways of linking the segments.  +
From the constructivist point of view, it is important to stress that it does not matter if the thing I perceive when I follow the direction in which the other is looking is not quite the same as the thing he or she perceives. What DOES matter, in order to link a word to a percept, is that, whenever he or she utters a specific word, I see something that I can consider the repetition of what I saw on similar previous occasions. The crucial feature is the coordination of attention.  +
The key point is that we may be able to analyze the structure of our experience without making the unwarranted assumption that to perceive must be a process of passive reception rather than a process of construction  +
With a rat in a Skinner box, for instance, it will no longer be sufficient to ask why the rat’s bar-presses become more or less frequent; we also have to ask how the rat succeeds in pressing the bar when it may have to start toward it from different places in the box. In other words, how is it that the rat – or ourselves, for that matter – ever manage to hit a target or attain a goal?  +
There is no good reason to believe that our senses somehow provide a one-to- one correspondence with something which we do not perceive.  +
And, if we apply the model to ourselves as organisms, we too cannot have access to our own environment because our experience, whatever it may be, lies on this side of the dashed line and can be composed only of the signals within our neural network.  +
there can be a “response” (i.e. activity) without a stimulus. Activity is triggered by an error signal, and an error signal is generated not only when there is a change in the sensory signal but also when there is a change in the reference value.  +
Human knowledge in general, and science in particular, is not engaged in uncovering certainty, truth, or reality, or any of the bugbears of dogmatic science.  +
This part of the loop, however, is not accessible to the organism itself, because, as Powers has said, the organism can perceive nothing but its own sensory signals  +
In other words, what the observer calls an “object”, is for the organism an inseparable component of an activity cluster. Nevertheless, at this point the stage is set for a momentous step that opens the way to a new kind of operation. No doubt, this step, like every other in the process of evolution, is fostered by the selective pressure of the environment; but for the functioning of the organism, it constitutes a discrete novelty like the opening of a new pathway in its processor.  +
According to the view I am proposing, communicatory behavior is a mode of action, its function is to link concerted activity, and it is indispensable because without these links there could be no unified social action. Thus it is an instrument which is to say, a tool.  +
For induction, whether it is conscious in the form of a conclusion we draw, or unconscious in the form of a behavior that becomes established because of its success, springs always from the same root: a more or less regular recurrence in past experience.  +
It is in this sense that communication must be considered “instrumental”, “goal-directed”, and therefore “purposive”.  +
In order to become a reference item, the object has to be cut loose from its original context where it was a more or less relevant sensory adjunct to an activity cluster, and it must become something very like a “representation”.  +
To sum up this discussion of linguistic communication, I would suggest three criteria to distinguish ‘‘language’’, all of which are necessary but individually insufficient: There must be a set (lexicon) of communicatory signs, i.e., perceptual items whose meaningfulness (SEMANTICITY) is constituted by a conventional tie (semantic nexus) and not by an inferential one. These signs must be symbols, i.e., linked to representations (SYMBOLICITY) therefore they can be sent without reference to perceptual instances of the items they designate, and received without “triggering” a behavioral response in the receiver. As symbols they merely activate the connected representation. There must be a set of rules (GRAMMAR) governing the combination of signs into strings such that certain combinations produce a new semantic content in addition to the individual content of the component signs.  +
To begin, we may say that there could hardly have been an evolution of speech, or language, if there had not been an origin.  +
An activity, thus, will be called “purposive” if it serves to reduce or eliminate the discrepancy (negative feedback) between the value of a sensory signal and the reference value in such a “teleological” unit.  +
I would like to submit that it is, indeed, the logic of science and the scientific method that frequently stops scientists from looking outside a specific domain of possibilities.  +
Seen in this way, the scientific method does not refer to, nor does it need, the assumption of an “objective” ontological reality—it concerns exclusively the experiential world of observers.  +
For many thousands of years the river Nile flooded the Egyptian lowlands near the Mediterranean coast at least once a year. Vast amounts of fresh water seeped into the soil, fertilized it, and created a natural pressure against the water of the sea. The floods were a nuisance and, quite apart from this, using the Nile’s water to irrigate parts of the desert up-stream seemed eminently desirable. So the Assuan Dam was built to solve these two problems. The Nile no longer got out of hand and new land up- stream could be irrigated and cultivated. For a little while the dam seemed a wonderful success of science and engineering. Then it became clear that the salt of the Mediterranean was slowly but steadily seeping into and devastating the lowlands along the coast which had fed Egypt for millennia.  +
That is to say, one must define certain experiences so that one can recognize them when one experiences them again. There can hardly be regularity before one has noticed repetition.  +
Hence, the seemingly paradoxical assertion that an observer sees only what he or she already knows. This, in fact, is called “assimilation.”  +
As Heinz von Foerster put it in conversation, ‘objectivity is the delusion that observations could be made without an observer’  +
The first is usually intended as an item isolated as part of experience; e.g. the chair you sit on, the keyboard in front of you, the hand that does the typing, the deep breath you have just taken. In short, any item of the furniture of someone’s experiential world can be called an object.  +
In both cases it clearly is an active experiencer who creates the units. What is not so obvious, is that the discrete entities that are counted, as well as the continuous ones to which units of measurement are applied, are also an experiencer’s creation.  +
To know, thus, is to have viable procedures or, as Maturana said “to operate adequately in an individual or cooperative situation” (1988, p.53).  +
Thus, what we ordinarily call ‘experience’ has already been ordered and structured into discrete ‘things’ by perceptual and conceptual operations which endless repetition has rendered unconscious, and by assimilation to more complex conceptual configurations that have been formed in past experience.  +
What we call “knowledge”, then, is the map of paths of action and thought which, at that moment in the course of our experience, have turned out to be viable for us.  +
Without going into the details of the process that links the experience of a thing with the experience of a word, it should be clear that both these items are composed of elements that are part of the acting subject’s experiential world and are, therefore, determined by what the subject attends to and how the subject perceives and conceives it.  +
That is to say, the proponents of a theory will assimilate new experiences as long as they possibly can, even in the face of considerable perturbations.  +
To be adapted, therefore, means no more and no less than to be viable.  +
In fact, the process of accommodation and adaptation of the meaning of words and linguistic expressions continues for each of us throughout our lives, and no matter how long we have spoken the language, there will still be occasions when we experience a perturbation and realize that we have been using a word in a way that turns out to be idiosyncratic in some particular respect.  +
Finally, it must be made clear that, while biologists may tend to think of viability and adaptedness in terms of differential reproduction, in the cognitive domain the two terms refer to the achievement and maintenance of internal equilibrium. For the constructivist, therefore, Knowledge has the function of eliminating perturbations; and the higher we move in the hierarchy of conceptual abstractions, the more the perturbations tend to be conceptual rather than material. This, obviously, is one of the features that make the constructivist approach interesting for therapists.  +
Solutions, from the constructivist perspective, are always relative — and this, in turn, makes clear that problems are not entities that lie about in the universe, independent of any experiencer. Instead, problems arise when obstacles block the way to a subject’s goal.  +
When the nail that holds up the wire to my computer falls out of the wall in my study and I use my shoe to hammer it in again, I am deliberately assimilating the shoe to the function of a hammer. It may work, or it may not, but even if it does work I am not led to believe that the shoe is a hammer. In contrast, a child that has just begun to associate two or three visual characteristics, such as four legs, a tail, and fur, with utterances of the word “dog”, may well utter that word when a new visual experience allows her to see these three characteristics. A psychologist who witnesses this, may smile and say: “Ah, you see, she assimilates the lamb to her concept of dog!” He will be quite right, of course, in making this assessment; but he will be wrong if he believes that the child’s utterance requires some special activity that is called “assimilation”. From the child’s point of view, given her criteria for using the word “dog”, the lamb is a dog, and she has no reason to modify her categorization until some unexpected event creates a perturbation. Only when the new item behaves in a way that seems undog-like to her, or when someone says “No, dear, this is a lamb”, will the child have occasion to accommodate, i.e., to look for a distinguishing characteristic and, if one can be found, to create a new conceptual category called “lamb”.  +
A person whose identity is questioned because the years of absence have made him unrecognizable to his family, will, as a last resort, recount memories of events experienced in their company.  +
I may judge the pain I have at this moment to be different from the pain I felt last week; and to make that judgement I do not have to hypothesize that the one comes from my sinus, the other from an impacted wisdom tooth; in fact, to compare any two percepts, I do not have to externalize their origin. Nor do I have to believe that these percepts are images of “objects”.  +
What one makes oneself can hardly be expected to have that perennial reliability one would like to attribute to the real world.  +
Thus, there is no basis for the assumption that re-presentations arise as internal images of an outside world; instead, it seems quite plausible that they constitute the material which the cognizing subject externalizes in the construction of reality.  +
the fiction of individual identity is the key element in the conceptual construction of the basic notions of space and time.  +
The pen I hold in my hand does not become another while you’re watching it. You are quite sure of that – at least until you’ve seen a sharper do a sleight of hand with cards. Then you suddenly realize that things can change their identity under your very eyes. It is a question of speed – and speed, after all, is the quotient of space an time. The conservation of individual identity may be more of a problem than it seemed.  +
Mount Etna towers over Sicily regardless of any Sicilians, the Monalisa smiles whether the Louvre is open to the public or not, and the river Inn flows down the Engadin even when no one dangles a toe in its icy water. All that (and more) is what we hold to be reality. The mountain, the painted smile, and – in spite of what Heraclitus said – even the flowing river, are supposed to have their place and to remain what they are.  +
Space is the medium in which things maintain or, as the case may be, change their location; time is the medium in which they must conserve their identity lest they disappear qua “things” and be reduced to momentary apparitions.  +
Take, for example, the two statements: “This is the same girl I saw yesterday” and “She bought the same dress as her sister.” The girl is one and the same individual, seen twice; the dresses are two, considered equivalent in every respect that one chose to take into account when comparing them.  +
“Sameness” and “difference”, then, refer to relations, and relations are instituted or constructed by the experiencing subject.  +
It concerns experience alone, experience segmented into chunks, if you will, but not items that exist in their own right, independently of the experiencer.  +
More often than not, this will do the trick, because the possession of specific memories is accepted as unquestionable proof of individual continuity.  +
Relations, therefore, are not “perceived” but fictitious  +
The meanings of words – and this also applies to every sign and every symbol – must be constructed by each user of the language individually, and this construction is based solely on the subjective experience of the particular parson. Hence it stands to reason that the interpretation of a word or a text will always remain an essentially subjective operation.  +
When you are engaged, as you are now, in reading what I have written, it can be said that communication is taking place. To be more precise, you are in the position of a receiver. Let’s take a moment to observe what goes on. To begin with, you have to be able to perceive a series of black marks printed on the page and to identify these marks, first as letters and then as combinations of letters forming words of a language with which you are familiar. You are familiar with a language whenever the meanings of most of its words hold some asso ciation for you. At that point, the perception of words calls up meanings in your head and you attempt to link these meanings together in order to develop larger conceptual structures that are related to the sentences of the text. If you succeed and manage to produce structures that appear reasonable to you, you feel that you have understood what the author intended to say.  +
Instead of “truth.” constructivism speaks of viability and compatibility with previously constructed models. In other words, scientific models are tools.  +
Yet, analysis of the process which led a student to answer in a particular way is one of the best means available towards an understanding of his or her concepts and mental operations.  +
Thus, instead of claiming that knowledge is capable of representing a world outside of our experience, we would say, as did the pragmatists, that knowledge is a tool within the realm of experience.  +
If knowledge cannot be transmitted, but must instead be constructed by each student individually, this does not imply that teaching must dispense with language. It implies only that the role of language must be conceived of differently.  +
For me, therefore, the world in which we find ourselves living, is the world that we have been able to build and maintain within the constraints we have so far experienced. – What could be more cybernetic than this?  +
each user of a language must build up meanings for him- or herself.  +
On the strength of all this, I came to believe that the meanings we attribute to words and phrases, and to whole speeches and texts, are meanings, or built up of meanings, that we ourselves have generated in our own experience. They are the result of “self-regulation” – and the study of self-regulation is an integral part of cybernetics.  +
concepts associated with words are not the same from person to person in one and the same language.  +
Knowledge was no longer expected to provide a “true” picture of an absolute reality – something the sceptics of all ages had shown to be impossible. Instead, it was to be seen as a means towards the organism’s equilibration.  +
Compatibility does not imply identity, it merely implies viability in the given circumstances. That is why, after having used a word in a particular way for fifty or more years, we may discover that it is not quite the way others are using it – it is just that the circumstances in which we have so far used the word happened to be such that they did not bring out any differences.  +
In general terms, the reduction of an error signal is always a move towards equilibrium.  +
Nach Piaget bedeutet Interaktion nicht, dass ein Organismus mit Objekten interagiert, wie sie „wirklich“ sind, sondern dass ein kognitives Subjekt sich mit zuvor konstruierten Wahrnehmungs- und Konzeptstrukturen auseinandersetzt.  +
Wenn wir das Lernen Studierender anregen wollen, dürfen wir nicht vergessen, dass Wissen außerhalb des Verstandes nicht existiert.  +
Die Analyse von Bedeutungen führt immer zu individuellen Erfahrungen und dem sozialen Prozess, die Verbindung zwischen Wörtern und dieser Erfahrung so lange berücksichtigen, bis das Individuum sie für kompatibel in der Verwendung, der sprachlichen und verhaltensbezogenen Reaktionen anderer hält.  +
Es ist eine Sache zu behaupten, dass der eigenen Erfahrung nach die Bedeutung, die andere einem Wort zuschreiben, mit der eigenen kompatibel zu sein scheint, aber eine andere, anzunehmen, dass die Bedeutungen gleich sind.  +
Wissen ist weniger eine genaue Darstellung externer Dinge, Situationen und Ereignisse, sondern mehr eine Abbildung von Handlungen und konzeptionellen Operationen, die sich in der Erfahrung des wissenden Subjekts bewährt haben.  +
Die Funktion von Intelligenz ist nicht jene, Lebewesen mit einer "wahren" Repräsentation einer objektiven Umwelt auszustatten, sondern mit intelligenten Tools, die eine Anpassung an die Welt ermöglichen, wie sie erfahren wird.  +
Lernen ist eine bewusssteoder unbewusst gesteuerte Aktivität wärhrend Anpassung in seiner grundlegenden Bedeutung keine Aktivität des Organismus ist.  +
Obwohl reflexive Handlungsmuster "verkablet" sind und für eine gewisse Zeit fixiert bleiben, können sie durch Erfahrung des Organismus verändert oder sogar abgebaut werden.  +
Der Drang zu Wissen ist auch Drang zur Anpassung. Dadurch sind Lernen und Anpassung komplementäre Phänomene  +
Traditionelle Sichtweise in Frage stellen  +
Anpassung kann nur zufälligen Variationen zugeschrieben werden.  +
Es gibt keinen Ausweg aus der Annahme, dass Organismen ihre Welt konstruieren.  +
Alles praktische Lernen kann als Ergebnis von Induction betrachtet werden  +
Um zu überleben, muss ein Organismus die Einschränkungen der Umwelt "überwinden".  +
Die Beziehung zwischen unserem Wissen und der "Realität" ähnelt jener zwischen Organismus und Umwelt: Konstruierte Ideen, Hypothesen und Modelle überleben, solange unsere Erfahrung erfolgreich hineinpasst.  +
Jede Konstruktion, ob physisch oder mental, unterliegt bestimmten Einschränkungen, die sich aus dem Material ergeben, das der Konstrukteur verwendet  +
Der einzige Hinweis auf die "reale" Struktur der Umwelt können wir durch Organismen erhalten, die nicht überleben. Die Überlebenden stellen lediglich eine Auswahl an undendlichen Lösungen dar, die ebenfalls lebensfähig sein könnten.  +
Ein neuer Gedanke muss sich in ein bestehendes Schema konzeptueller Strukturen anpassen, damit er keine Wiedersprüche versucht und somit viabel ist.  +
Es gibt keine Konstruktion ohne eine Form der Reflexion  +
Jede Sprechergruppe hat für sich eine "richtige" Weise, auf die Welt zu blicken, es gibt aber keine Richtigkeit außerhalb von Sprechergruppen.  +
Wissenschaftliche Referenz  +
Wissen ist konstruiert  +
Es muss einen Ort außerhalb des eigenen Erfahrungsbereichs geben, in dem Dinge sein können, wenn sie nicht erlebt werden.  +
Zeit ist keine Illusion  +
Wir können Dinge unterscheiden, weil wir "Informationen" der sogenannten "Außenwelt" erhalten.  +
Wir können nur wissen, was wir selbst gemacht haben  +
Wissen bietet keine Darstellung einer unabhängigen Welt, sondern eine Karte dessen, was in der erlebten Umgebung getan werden kann.  +
Rhetorische Figur: Irreführungen aufzeigen  +
Auch wenn wir glauben, dass wir etwas von der Außenwelt wissen können, können wir nie sagen, ob dieses Wissen wahr ist.  +
Hinterfragung der bisherigen Annahmen  +
Sprache erlaubt uns zu Sprechen, nich nur über Dinge, die räumlich oder zeitlich entfernt sind, sindern auch über Dinge, nirgendwo sind und nie passieren.  +
Es kann keine Entwicklung der Sprache geben, wenn es keinen Ursprung gegeben hat. Keine Evolution ohne Ursprung  +
Ein neues Referenzelement und den Zyklus, den es steuert, kann als "künstlich" bezeichnet werden.  +
Lernen, ob bewusst oder unbewusst, entspringt immer derselben Wurzel: einem mehr oder weniger regelmäßigen Wieederauftreten in vergangener Erfahrung.  +
Wenn ein Individuum durch seine Handlung nicht nur seine eigene Störung sondern auch die Störung anderer Individuen reduziert, führt dies zwangsläufig zur Bildung von Gruppen  +
Infragestellen und falschen Weg aufzeigen  +
Gruppenbildung und Kollaboration führt zu Kommunikation  +
Kommunikationsverhalten entwickelt sich in Situationen, in denen die Zusammenarbeit nicht nur die additive Aktivität mehrerer Personen erfordert, sondern auch eine Organisation im Sinne der Aufgabenteilung  +
Der Gebrauch von Sprache muss konventionell sein  +
Ein Sprecher kann unter keinen anderen Umsätnden als über andere Sprecher die ordnungsgemäße Verwendens neuer Zeichen erwerben  +
Für den Organismus kann es keine Sache wie die "Umwelt" geben  +
Kommunikation ist als "instrumental", "zielorientiert" und damit "zielgerichtet" zu betrachten.  +
Der Raum ist das Medium, in dem Dinge ihren Ort bewahren bzw. verändern, die Zeit ist das Medium, in dem sie ihre Identität bewahren, damit sie nicht auf momentane Erscheinungen reduziert werden  +
Für den Vergleich von Erfahrungen braucht es keine Gegenstände, die für sich exisiterien, sondern allein Erfahrung  +
Beziehungen zwischen Gegenständen werden nicht wahrgenommen, sondern sind fiktiv  +
Die Fiktion der individuellen Identität ist das Schlüsselelement in der konzeptionellen Konstruktion der Grundbegriffe von Raum und Zeit  +
Infragestellen allgemien gültiger Annahmen  +
Es gibt keine Grundlage für die Annahme, dass Repräsentationen innere Bilder der Außenwelt sind, sie bilden aber das Material, das das erkennende Subjekt in der Konstruktion von Realität externalisiert  +
Der Besitz bestimmter Erinnerungen wird als unbestreitbarer Beweis für die individuelle Kontinuität akzeptiert  +
Weil der Erfahrende selbst entscheiden kann, was gleich, ähnlich oder unterschiedlich ist, sind die Beziehungen zwischen Gegenständen immer konstruiert.  +
Was jemand selbst macht, kann nie die beständige Zuverlässigkeit haben, die man der "realen Welt" zuschreiben möchte  +
Infragestellen traditioneller Sichtweisen  +
Weil die Bedeutung eines neuen Wortes nicht einfach erklärt werden kann, muss jeder Sprechende die Bedeutungen von Wörtern selbst aufbauen, womit sie immer subjektiv sind.  +
Weil jeder Mensch auf unterschiedliche Erfahrungen zurückgreift und Dinge je nach Erfahrungsstand unterschiedlich wahrgenommen werden, können Bedeutungen von Wörtern nie auf die selbe Art und Weise erfasst werden.  +
Überwinden traditioneller Ansichten  +
Der Umstand, dass zwei Personen zwar die gleiche sprechen, sich aber trotzdem missverstehen können, zeigt, dass die Bedeutung von Wörtern und Sätzen durch Erfahrung gebildet wird.  +
Weil wir durch Anpassung und den Kontext Diskrepanzen im Verstehen vermeiden können, bedeutet Kompatibilität nicht Identität, sondern Durchführbarkeit unter den gegebenen Umständen.  +
Weil Entwicklungen und Aktivitäten nicht Bezug auf Ursachen aber in Bezug auf Einschränkungen erklärt werden kann, ist die Welt in der wir leben, die Welt, die wir im Rahmen unserer Einschränkungen konstruieren konnten.  +
Überwinden traditioneller Konzepte  +
Eine Theorie/Annahme bekommt nicht genug Aufmerksamkeit  +
Neue Erkentnisse, die schockieren  +
Weil jede Sprache und jedes Wort in dieser Sprache eine unterschiedliche Realität darstellt, unterscheiden sich sprachliche Konzepte von Person zu Person.  +
Weil ein Organismus sich anpasst, um die durch seine Umgebung gesetzten Einschränkungen zu überwinden, passt sich auch Wissen an, um das Gleichgewicht des Organismus zu erhalten. Wissen kann somit kein Abbild einer absoluten Realität sein.  +