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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qx542fr476","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ27Ӻ","startOffset":139,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ17Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":341°Ӻ,"quote":"As for the second type, “reflective thought” or “reflected abstraction”, it is the only one about which Piaget makes an explicit statement concerning awareness:\n\nFinally, we call the result of a reflective abstraction “reflected” abstraction, once it has become conscious, and we do this independently of its level. (Piaget et al., 1977, vol.II; p.303. Emphasis added).\nWhen one comes to this statement in Piaget’s summary at the end of the second volume on the specific topic of reflective abstraction, it becomes clear that the sequence in which he usually discusses the three types is a little misleading, because it is neither a developmental nor a logical sequence. What he rightly calls “reflective thought” and lists as the second of three types, describes a cognitive phenomenon that is much more sophisticated than reflective abstractions of type one or type three and, moreover, is relevant also as a further development of empirical abstraction. I would suggest that the two meanings of the word “reflection” be assigned in the following way to Piaget’s classification of abstractions: it should be interpreted as projection and adjusted organization on another operational level in the case of reflective abstraction type one and pseudo-empirical abstraction; and it should be taken as conscious thought in the case of reflective abstraction type two (also called “reflected”). In his two volumes La prise de conscience (1974b) and Reussir et comprendre (1974c), there is a wealth of observational material from which Piaget and his collaborators infer that consciousness appears hesitantly in small steps each of which conceptualizes a more or less specific way of operating. Like von Humboldt, Piaget takes the mind’s ability to step out of the experiential flow for granted, but he then endeavors to map when and under what conditions the subject’s awareness of its own operating sets in; and he tries to establish how action evolves in its relation to the conceptualization which characterizes the attainment of consciousness (Piaget, 1974b; p.275ff). In the subsequent volume, he provides an excellent definition of what it is that awareness contributes:\n\nTo succeed is to comprehend in action a given situation to a degree sufficient to attain the proposed goals: to understand is to master in thought the same situations to the point that one can resolve the problems they pose with regard to the why and the how of the links one has established and used in one’s actions. (Piaget, 1974c; p.237)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210023416141222439182":^°°,^"jQuery3210023416141222439182":^°°,^"jQuery3210023416141222439182":^°°,^"jQuery3210023416141222439182":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1560437832819°
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