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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"J18t9w2qj0","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":1649,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/preӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":347°Ӻ,"quote":"Hume has explained how we establish such connections: the repeated observation that the two items happened in temporal contiguity led us to infer and formulate a rule that says, if A happens, B will follow. Therefore, if we want B to happen, we try to generate A. In other words, we have a purpose and we act in a way which, we believe, will attain it. \nThe psychological establishment, which, from the 20s of this century until well into the 70s, was dominated in the United States by the dogma of behaviorism, considered purpose a mentalistic superstition. “Careless references to purpose are still to be found in both physics and biology, but good practice has no place for them,” Skinner still wrote in 1971. \nNatural scientists in physics, chemistry, and astronomy had found no reason to engage in thoughts about purpose in their disciplines, and they relegated it summarily to the realm of teleology. As Ernest Nagel put it: \n\nPerhaps the chief reason why most contemporary natural scientists disown teleology, and are disturbed by the use of teleological language in the natural sciences, is that the notion is equated with the belief that future events are active agents in their own realization. Such a belief is undoubtedly a species of superstition. (Nagel, 1965; p.24)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321093015586752779912":^°°,^"jQuery321093015586752779912":^°°,^"jQuery321093015586752779912":^°°,^"jQuery321093015586752779912":^°°,^"jQuery321093015586752779912":^°°,^"jQuery321093015586752779912":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1575889415402°
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