| Annotation Metadata
|
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vd9dxl4opa","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":3557,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/preӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":136°Ӻ,"quote":"Piaget himself, throughout his work, remained extremely reticent about the nature of consciousness. In his Insights and Illusions of Philosophy (1971), he discussed his disagreements with the definitions of consciousness of Bergson, Husserl, Sartre, and other philosophers, but refrained from presenting an explanatory model of his own. In La prise de conscience (1974) – a title that, as Leslie Smith has pointed out, should be translated as “The attainment of consciousness”, he provided evidence that consciousness is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but has several successive levels. Finally, and I think most significantly, he explained in his conversations with Jean-Claude Bringuier: \n\nWe study behavior, including consciousness when one can attain it, but when one cannot attain it, it is no problem. (Piaget, 1977, p.18)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321030574901961068182":^°°,^"jQuery321030574901961068182":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1568990004511°
|
