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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vs9iimwjxl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":55,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":1628°Ӻ,"quote":"Whatever one assumes to be genetically determined in children, it is they themselves who must actively isolate units in their experiential field and abstract them into concepts. Having done this, they must separate in their auditory experience those acoustic units that belong to a linguistic system from other units that do not. Only then can they tentatively associate specific items of the first type (concepts) with items of the second (sound-images of words). That children do all this unawares does not support the notion that it happens by itself without any effort on their part. The semantic connection has to be formed in their heads. \nMany authors, e.g. Rorty (1982) and Gergen (1994), suggest that whatever we want to think of as ‘meaning’ is acquired in the course of what Wittgenstein (1953) called “language games”. This rightly points to the fact that children cannot guess all by themselves which sounds constitute words and what their meanings might be. It can only be done in the contexts of social interaction. Language games are the occasion for the construction of meaning, But they do not explain how children do it. Social Constructionists (a term invented by Kenneth Gergen to distinguish his way of thinking from that of other constructivists) are obviously aware of the problem. Gergen explicitly states: “the constructionist is centrally concerned with such matters as negotiation, cooperation, conflict, rhetoric, ritual, roles, social scenarios, and the like, but avoids psychological explanations of microsocial process” (Gergen, 1994; p.25).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321063495242117293842":^°°,^"jQuery321063495242117293842":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1566390105787°
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