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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zoxz63m9xt","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":191,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ9Ӻ/supӶ2Ӻ/aӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":4°Ӻ,"quote":"The phrase “that which works” must be interpreted somewhat differently, depending on the realm in which it is used. In the cognitive realm, something will be said to “work” when it does what is expected of it in the context of attaining a goal. This is a delicate and often debated point. Given the longstanding objection, both in psychology and biology, against the notions of goal or purpose, we want to be very explicit about it. \nIn the realm of phylogeny, to “work” means no more than to be viable, to manage to survive and to procreate, and the repetition of that which works is built into the conceptual system that constitutes the theory of evolution. What does not work, or is not viable, is necessarily eliminated. Because survival and the perpetuation of the genome are the central mechanisms of the theory, biologists need not, and indeed must not, attribute any goal or purpose to the process of evolution which the theory purports to describe.Ӷ10Ӻ","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321059020409721439472":^°°,^"jQuery321059020409721439472":^°°,^"jQuery321059020409721439472":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1568975537525°
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