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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tk56m8bfvd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ26Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":239°Ӻ,"quote":"Almost fifty years ago, my friend and teacher Silvio Ceccato made a remark which, I think, is germane to today’s topic because it throws light on the distinction between perception and re-presentation.\nThe most obvious instances of re-presentations happen in our dreams, when there is no perceptual activity at all. These re-presentations, Ceccato said, start from a concept and manifest only such sensory characteristics as are needed in the particular story of the dream.\nYou may, for example, dream that you are in a room, but all you see of the room is a door (perhaps because you expect someone to come in through it). You have no idea of the size of the room, and there are no windows, curtains, pictures, no ceiling or furniture, or anything else that usually characterizes a room. These items may come in later—as the plot of the dream develops— but at this point, they are irrelevant in your dream-presentation of a room.\nIn contrast, your perception of a room starts from sensory impressions that you proceed to coordinate, and they then allow you to consider them compatible with your concept of “room”.\nOne can therefore say: in perception, sensory signals call up a concept, in re-presentation, on the other hand, a concept calls up sensory impressions. In neither case is the experience caused by what philosophers want to call “reality”.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°,^"jQuery321078592971054396342":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1564135701299°
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