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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zcmeefk08w","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","endOffset":1286°Ӻ,"quote":"Thus, in order to deal with circularity, it seems necessary to depart more radi- cally from our basic ontological commitments (Quine). The state of affairs in logic goes hand in hand with the Western preoccupation in epistemology to exclude the observer from observation: Subject and object are considered in opposition and mutually exclusive. Only few thinkers (Gunther, 1967: von Foerster, 1974) have recently pointed out that the problems of observer/observed, of cognition, and of self- reference are one and the same and that this problem looks so formidable because of the grounds (ontological commitments) that Western logic has decided to stand on. In order to incorporate the observer into his descriptions, says Gunther, we must give that interrelation a logical locus. This, as we have discussed elsewhere in detail, can be done (Varela, 1975; Varela and Goguen, 1976, 1977). The rehabilitation of circular rationality rests on two departures from the previous, purely logical attempts, and it is relevant to the issues discussed here as well as to empirical research. First, the question of circularity is examined on the ground of the very basic act of indication (discussed above as the “first cut” made by a knower) and the laws of its forms (Brown, 1969, Varela, 1975).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210354372536760819032":^°°,^"jQuery3210354372536760819032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1594919262473°
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