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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rop9uazx64","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/preӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":179°Ӻ,"quote":"In spite of this unsympathetic attitude, the term teleology has recently become more frequent in the discussions of scientists and even in the literature that is considered scientific. This, I would claim, is not due to an inconsistency in scientific thinking but rather to an inconsistency in the meaning attributed to the term. The inconsistency is not a random mutation but the surfacing of a distinction which, among others, was pushed out of sight by the particular view of causality inherent in Galilei’s and Newton’s mechanics. The spectacular success of mechanistic thinking led to the conviction that the only type of causation relevant to the scientific enterprise was the type Aristotle had isolated and described as efficient cause. Richard Taylor summarized the historical development in Edwards’ Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967): \n\nThe concepts of material and formal causes are archaic and now have little significance outside aesthetics. Final causes have likewise been expurgated from physics. (Vol.II, p.56)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321096051066034122692":^°°,^"jQuery321096051066034122692":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1576064334946°
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